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WHITHER THE NIXON BOARD?
J. Ralph Beaird*
Mack A. Player"
The Nixon administrationhas now appointed a majority of members
to the National Labor Relations Board. With this change in Board
composition have come significantshifts in labor policy. The authors of
this Article examine these shifts in policy in light of the approachesof
past Boards.t

W

ITH the advent of each new national administration, a now
familiar ritual takes place. National Labor Relations Board
watchers scrutinize with care the experience and background of the
new Board appointees and survey each Board decision in which they
participate for hints of major shifts in national labor policy. Kenneth
McGuiness says this is so because "the NLR.B has been an agency where
interpretations of the law have been peculiarly dependent on the predilections of its members."' Now that a Board has been assembled with
a majority of Nixon appointees,2 it is traditional, if not appropriate, to

review their decisions to see if there are any discernible changes in
direction from the Kennedy-Johnson Board.2
It is dear that there have been several significant substantive law
changes by the new Board. These changes will have real impact and
are discussed in later sections of this Artide. However, a new Board
can make its presence felt in a less overt way by drawing inferences
from facts different from those drawn by the preceding Board. These
changes in the fact finding role of the Board can markedly affect
national labor policy, and will be examined in the first section of this
Article.
* Acting Dean, University of Georgia School of Law. A.B., LL.B., University of Alabama,
1949, 1951; LL.M. George Washington University, 1953.
*' Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. A.B., Drury College,
1963; J.D., University of Missouri, 1965, LLM.,George Washington University, 1972.
t This article is the product of a tutorial project conducted by Dean Beaird, with substantial assistance from Professor Mack Player. Students contributing to the project were
John Allgood, Thomas K. Carroll, Jr., James L. Ford, and Franklin R. Nix.
I K. McGuINmss, THE Nsw FRoNTmR NLRB 1 (1963).
2 The Nixon appointees are Chairman Miller and Members Kennedy and Penello.
3 See also Isaacson, Discernible Trends in the "Miller" Board-PracticalConsiderations
for the Labor Counsel, 23 LAB. UJ.531 (1972).
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CHANGES IN THE BoARD's FINDING OF FACT

Under the original Wagner Act 4 the findings of the Board, upon
court review, were conclusive "if supported by evidence."5, The factfinding role of the Board was described by the Supreme Court in
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRBG as follows:
Plainly this statutory plan for an adversary proceeding requires
that the Board's orders on complaints of unfair labor practices
be based upon evidence .... Such a requirement does not go
beyond the necessity for the production of evidential facts, however, and compel evidence as to the results which may flow from
such facts.... An administrative agency with power after hearings
to determine on the evidence in adversary proceedings whether
violations of statutory commands have occurred may infer within
the limits of the inquiry from the proven facts such conclusions
as reasonably may be based upon the facts proven. One of the
purposes which lead to the creation of such boards is to have decisions... made by experienced officials with an adequate appreciation of the complexities of the subject which is entrusted to
7
their administration.
In 1947 Congress changed the standard of deference to NLRB factfinding upon court review. In enacting the Taft-Hartley Act Congress
provided that the Board's findings of fact would be conclusive only if
supported by "substantial evidence." s Some Congressmen believed that
this change would "materially broaden the scope of the court's reviewing power ' 9 and thus infuse more uniformity and predictability into
Board findings of fact.
Even with this statutory change, however, the Board still has considerable latitude in fact-finding which will be conclusive on subsequent review. The special role of the Board in drawing inferences from
evidential facts described in Republic Aviation has been reiterated
since Taft-Hartley in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB.10 In that case
4 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
5 § 10(f), 49 Stat. 455 (1935).

6 324 US. 793 (1945).
7 Id.

at 799-800.
8 National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter cited as NLRA] § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(t)

(1970).
9 H. R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1947); see H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th

Cong., Ist Sess. 41-43 (1947); S.RE'. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1947).
10 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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the Supreme Court said that the Taft-Hartley amendments were not
intended
to negative the function of the Labor Board as one of the agencies
presumably equipped or informed by experience to deal with a
specialized field of knowledge, whose findings within that field
carry the authority of an expertness which courts do not possess
and therefore must respect."
Thus the way in which the Board exercises its fact-finding role
can significantly change the impact of the Act without changing a
single substantive rule of law. As a result of this process, the Act can
take on a different meaning than it had under prior Boards.
A. Impact of the Nixon Board's Fact-Findingon §§ 8(a)(3), 8(aXl),
and 9

The Board's power in this area can be illustrated by examining the
Nixon Board's interpretation of two important areas of labor lawthe traditional section 8(a)312 pretext cases which involve employer discrimination to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization, and the Board's role in policing election propaganda under
sections 8(a)(1)13 and 9.14

1. Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA-Under section 8(a)(3) an employer's discrimination against an employee is an unfair labor practice only
if the employer's motive was to encourage or discourage union activity.15 Thus the Board must analyze the facts given and determine
whether the requisite employer motive was present. Clearly, two
'lId.
12

at 488.

NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 US.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). This section provides
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-

(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization ....
's rd. § 8(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970). This section provides
(a) It shall be an unfai labor practice for an employer(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title ....
14 Id. § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
15 American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 880 U.S. 300, 313 (1965). The Board may infer
improper motive without specific evidence of intent to discourage union membership if
the practices are inherently prejudicial to union interests. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.,
373 US. 221 (1963); Radio Officer's Union v. NLRB, 847 U.S. 17 (1954); see American Ship
Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, supra at 311. See generally Getman, Section 8(aX3) of the NLRA and
the Effort to Insulate Free Employee Choice, 32 U. Cm. 1. REV. 735, 743-52 (1965).
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different Boards may reach different motive conclusions from the same
set of facts and still be within the allowable area for purposes of conclusiveness for the courts of appeals.
No change has yet been detected in the way in which the Nixon
Board as a whole infers employer motivation from a given set of facts.
However, there is some indication that at least Chairman Miller applies
a stricter standard for inferring improper employer motivation than
do his colleagues. Mark Twain Marine Industries, Inc.10 provides a
good illustration of this stricter approach. In that case a woman employee claimed she was discharged for her activities on behalf of a
union that was trying to organize the plant in which she worked. The
employer asserted that the employee was fired for "visiting too much"
and "poor workmanship."'1 The trial examiner credited the employee.
A majority 8 of the Board members agreed, refusing to overrule the
examiner's credibility-finding, and concluded that the employer had
the requisite bad intentions. They ordered that the employee be reinstated with back pay. Chairman Miller dissented. He said that he
would not infer that an employer had prohibited intentions unless the
employee's testimony was corroborated.' 9
In coming to the defense of his fellow trial examiner, John F. Funke
had this to say about Mark Twain Marine Industries, Inc.:
I am in disagreement with the approach ... taken by Chairman
Miller in his dissent....
...In such cases there is no substitute for personal observation
of the witnesses while under oath and, while errors will be made,
they are less likely to be made by an experienced trial examiner
who has heard the case.., than by an ipse dixit conclusion formed
from a printed record.
I also reject the suggestion that individual charging parties
occupy a special and inferior status as witnesses. . . No theory
16 185 N.L.R.B. 746 (1970).

Trial Examiner's findings in case no. 14-CA-5348 (May 20, 1970).
The Board in this case pursuant to the provisions of section 3(b) of the National
Labor Relations Act (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1970)), delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel composed of Members Fanning and Brown
and Chairman Miller. Members Fanning and Brown constituted the majority for the decision.
19 185 N.L.R.B. at 746.
17
18
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of credibility has been more completely discredited than that of
resort to a head count to determine the issue.2 0
Identical objections were raised by the Supreme Court in 196221 to
a7 prior fifth circuit decision which advocated a position strikingly
similar to that of Chairman Miller. In NLRB v. Tex-O-Kan Flour
Mills Co.,22 the circuit court established a stricter standard of review
for reinstatment with back pay orders, holding that there must be
impeachment of the discharging employer or substantial contradiction
of his testimony before such an order would be upheld.= In rejecting
this approach, the Supreme Court observed that the trial examiner
was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and
appraise their testimony than either the Board or the reviewing court. 4
Thus apparently neither the Supreme Court nor the remaining members of the Board have as yet adopted the position of Chairman Miller.25 However, as Mr. Funke himself pointed out in criticizing the
Chairman's approach, ". . . today's dissent may well be tomorrow's
law." 26 Even if other Board members continue to reject this stricter
standard of review, sharp dissents like the one in Mark Twain Industries, Inc. have provided like-minded courts with an easy approach to
upsetting Board orders.
2. Sections 8(a)(1) and 9 of the NLRA-A more direct change has
taken place in the way the Nixon Board draws effect conclusions in its
role of policing election campaigns. The Board may overturn an
election under two theories. It may find, under section 8(a)(1), - that
the employer's actions constitute an unfair labor practice because they
"interfere with, restrain or coerce" the employee in the exercise of his
protected rights.28 Or, if the employer's actions do not rise to the level
of an unfair labor practice, the Board may overturn an election because
the employer interfered with the employee's right to make a reasoned
20 Trial Examiner's findings in cases nos. 24-CA-2843, and 24-CB-733 (Nov. 13, 1970), reprinted in BNA, DAmY LABoR REP. No. 222 at A-3 (Nov. 16, 1970).
21 NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 US. 404 (1962).
22 122 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1941).
23 Id. at 438-39.
24 Id.
25 See Federal Prescription Service, 203 N.LJLB. No. 145, 83 IL.R.R.IL
26 See note 20 supra.
27 NLRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
28 Id.
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choice under section 9.29 The Kennedy Board well summarized this
two-pronged approach in Sewell Mfg. Co.80 when it said,
our function, as we see it, is to conduct elections in which the
employees have the opportunity to cast their ballots for or against
a labor organization in an atmosphere conducive to the sober and
informed exercise of the franchise, free not only from interference,
restraint, or coercion violative of the Act, but also from other
elements which prevent or impede a reasoned choice. 81
Of course the requirement in section 9 that elections be conducted
under ideal conditions for employee freedom of choice8 2 avoids the
29 Id. § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
80 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
81 Id.
82 NLRA § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970). See, e.g., Sewell Mfg. Co., 188 N.L.R.B. 66, 70

(1962). The requirement that elections be conducted under ideal conditions for employee
freedom of choice is referred to as the "laboratory conditions" standard. The conduct of
elections under "laboratory conditions" was first announced in General Shoe Corp., 77
NL.JRB. 124, 127 (1948):
In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a laboratory In which
an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to
determine the uninhibited desires of the employees .... When . . . the standard

drops too low ... the experiment must be conducted over again.
The Eisenhower Board tended to apply 8(c) to pre-election speech and to reject the
laboratory conditions standard. So long as the statements could be classed as a prediction
or statement of legal position, no sanctions were imposed. Esquire, Inc., 107 N.L.RJ3.
1238 (1954) (employer promised to litigate before bargaining with union); Silver Knit
Hosiery Mills, Inc., 99 N.L.R.B. 422 (1952) (prediction that if union selected employer
might close plant). See Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elec.
tions Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HIv. L. REv. 38 (1964). According to
Bok,
in principle, the policy was sound enough, for when the employer simply pointed out
the adverse consequences which might lawfully result from unionization he provided
the employees with information that was clearly pertinent to the decision they were
called upon to make. In practice, however, the policy gave hostile employers great
leeway to indulge in dire predictions in order to dissuade the employee from supporting the union.
Id. at 75.
See also, Christensen, Free Speech, Propaganda and the National Labor Relations Act,
38 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 243, 258 (1963); Wirtz, The New National Labor Relations Board; Herein
of "Employer Persuasion," 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 594 (1954).
The Kennedy Board, however, reestablished the laboratory standard in Dal-Tex Optical
Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962):
Conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) is, a fortiorari, conduct which Interferes with the
exercise of a free and untrammeled choice in an election. This is so because the test
of conduct which may interfere with the "laboratory conditions" for an election is
considerably more restrictive than the test of conduct which amounts to interference,
restraint, or coercion which violates Section 8(a)(1).
Id. at 1786-87.
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strictures on the Board of section 8(c), which provides that an employer's statement must amount to "a threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit '83 to constitute an unfair labor practice. However,
in the context of the Board's fact-finding role, whether or not 8(c) applies is immaterial because under both sections 8(a)l and 9 the Board
must infer the effect on employees of the employer or union action. Employer motivation does not matter. Thus the Board must determine
whether or not the employer's speech or actions had the effect of interfering, restraining or coercing the employee in the exercise of his rights;
or it must determine whether or not the employer's speech or actions
had the effect of impeding the employee in making a reasoned choice.
Up to now the Board has been very unscientific in its determination
of the effect of certain speech or action on an employee. In fact, Board
members have had little more than their own visceral reaction to guide
them in determining this effect. As a result, this determination has
varied with the Board member's experience, background, expertise and
possibly political bias; and over the years this variance in drawing
effect conclusions has been great. To the Eisenhower Board certain
statements by an employer were not considered to have the requisite
effect on employees; the Kennedy-Johnson Board, however, was able
to infer from very similar language sufficient adverse effect to overturn
an election. Today it appears that similar statements will draw no
sanctions from the Board in an election campaign.
These changes may be illustrated by showing the different Board conclusions as to the effect of two types of employer language on employees. The first type is language in which the employer, in an election
campaign, tells his employees of the disadvantages of unionism and how
it may lead to eventual closing of the plant. The second type is statements by an employer to the effect that his wage policy will be unaffected by unionism.

(a.) Employer statements regarding the disadvantages of unionismIn Silver Knit Hosiery Mills, Inc.,84 a case decided by the Eisenhower
Board, a union challenged an election, claiming employer interference
through his pre-election statements. The employer had said that a
union would cause strikes, lost pay and higher costs which could lead

to a closing of the company. He also said that the company is not required to grant the union's request but is only required by law to
bargain in good faith. The Eisenhower Board held that these state33 NLRA § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970).
34 99 N.LJRB. 422 (1952).
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ments did not have a proscribed effect on the employees. It took the
view that labor elections like political campaigns permitted broad
propaganda claims and predictions. Applying its experience and expertness, the Board said the remarks were "in the nature of a prophesy that
labor trouble might bring financial difficulties which would in turn
prevent the Employer from continuing to operate."8
However, to a Kennedy-Johnson Board sitting in Dal-Tex Optical
Co.38 similar statements were held to have the effect of interfering with
employee free choice and the election was overturned. The employer
in that case had said:
If I am required by the Court to bargain with this Union, whenever that may be, I will bargain in good faith, but I will have to
bargain on a cold-blooded business basis. You may come out with
a lot less than you have now. Why gamble because agitators make
wild promises to you? If I am required to bargain and I cannot
agree there is no power on earth that can make me sign a contract with this Union, so what will probably happen is the Union
will call a strike.8 7
Unlike Silver Knit Hosiery this language made no mention of closing
the plant. Discarding the idea that labor elections were to be governed
by the same rules as political elections, the Board decided the statements were not a prophesy but rather were "calculated to convey to the
employees the danger and futility of their designating the Union"88 and
thus interfered with the employees' free choice.
To the current Board statements of a similar scope do not have the
effect of interference. For example, in AAA Lapco, Inc. 9 the employer
had claimed that all wages, benefits and working conditions would be
negotiated, not just demands for additional wages, benefits, and working conditions. He also said that the union could enforce its demands
only through costly strikes affecting the company's competitive advantage and leading to replacement of strikers. The Board held that these
statements did not violate section 8(a)(1) or interfere with representative elections. In another recent case the employer said unionization
would lead to plant removal. 40 Again the new Board refused to set the
35 Id. at 424.
36 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962).
87 Id. at 1784.
38 Id. at 1785.
89 197 N.L.R.B. No. 50, 80 L.R.R.M. 1361 (1972).
40

Birdsall Constr. Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 80 L.R.R.M. 1580 (1972).
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election aside. Instead the Board said the statements were "nothing
more than an objective statement of the financial problems" which the
company would face in the event of unionization and "a prediction that
such problems could make relocation an economic necessity."' 1
(b.) Employer statements regarding the impact of unionism on wage
policy-Similar wage policy statements have also implied different
things to different boards. A good illustration of the attitude of the
Eisenhower Board toward a wage policy statement is Esquire,Inc.12 In
that case the employer had said he would always pay high wages voluntarily with or without a union contract and that selection of the union
would not mean bargaining until after extended court litigation. The
Eisenhower Board did not find the prohibited effect on the employees
and overruled the union objection. It said that the statements were
43
merely "an expression of the employer's legal position.1"
The Kennedy Board in 1962 was faced with similar employer language. In The Trane Co.44 the employer had said that his wages
were equal to or better than other firms and he would not change his
wage policy, union or no union. This Board set the election aside,
saying that the speech was "calculated to have a coercive effect upon
employees" 45 and showed that selection of representatives would be a
futile act.
In 1970, review of similar language by the Nixon Board resulted
in a return to the effect conclusions of the Eisenhower Board. In Rudy's
Farm Co, 46 the employer had said that the union had gained nothing
for other workers, and that the company's wage and benefits would be
passed on without the presence of a union. The employer then added:
Always you should bear in mind that it is Rudy's which furnished
you a job and your paycheck-not the . . . Union. And always
you should bear in mind that the... Union will never furnish you
a day's work nor a cent of your paycheck. 47
Overruling the union's objection and the finding of the hearing officer,
the Board said the speech was not excessive but a "legitimate assertion
of the Employer's views ... that he had treated the employees fairly
41 Id. at 1581.

42 107 N.LY.B. 1238 (1954).
43 Id. at 1239.
44 137 N.L.B. 1506 (1962).
45 Id. at 1510.
46 190 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 77 L.R.R.M. 1157 (1971).
47 Id. at 1158.
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and would continue to do so, coupled with a request that the employees
vote against the union."48

The conclusion is obvious. In its role of policing election campaigns
the Nixon Board is drawing the same conclusions from facts that
would have been drawn by the Eisenhower Board. These conclusions

are significantly different from those of the Kennedy-Johnson Board.
Today, employers in their pre-election speeches apparently can tell
employees that bargaining will be from scratch, 40 that higher union
costs could cause. plant removal, 0 that selection of the union will end
personal consultation with the employer over problems,51 and that
2
economic strikers can be replaced permanently.5
B. Conclusion
These ten year fluctuations from Board to Board are not the result
of any dramatic change in legal philosophy, but are primarily the result
of Boards with differing make-ups drawing different conclusions from
the facts. As pointed out earlier, no Board member has a concrete
guide as to what conclusion to reach concerning the effect of employer
speech or actions upon the employee in a pre-election setting. If such a
guide were provided, effect findings could be placed on a more stable
footing. Chairman Miller has indicated that greater use may be made
of empirical research such as that being conducted by Professors Getman, Goldberg and Herman, and reported in the journal of Legal
Studies at the University of Chicago last year.A This type of research
could provide a basis for determining such things as the effect of campaign statements on employees, and thus insure a greater uniformity
in effect findings.
A brief review of the results of the Chicago study is instructive.
Voters in two union elections were interviewed. The results indicate
that eighty percent of the employees voted on the basis of pre-campaign
attitudes toward unions. This fact suggests that for the great bulk of
employees the campaign may not be significant in altering an initial
predisposition to vote for or against union representation. In fact, the
study points out that the campaign may strengthen this predisposition;
48 Id.

49 Wagner Indus. Prod. Co., 170 N.L.R.B. 1413 (1968).
50 Birdsall Constr. Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 80 L.R.R.M. 1580 (1972).

51 AAA Lapco, Inc., 197 NJL.R.B. No. 50, 80 L.R.R.M. 1361 (1972).
52 Bostitch Div. of Textron, Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. No. 47, 71 L.R.R.M. 1241 (1969).
53 Getman, Goldberg, & Herman, The National Labor Relations Board Voting Study: A
PreliminaryReport, 1 J. LEGAL Stmms 233 (1972).
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but it does not appear to change it. Of the remaining 20 percent,
the study indicates that 90 percent of these voted against the union.
When tested about the campaign issues, however, they were less
familiar with the employer's campaign than any other group. The
study also demonstrates that employees do not perceive conduct as
coercive which the Board labels as such. Apparently then the switch is
not made because of the campaign.
The clear implication of this research is that the Board should be
cautious in finding violations of sections 8(a)(1) and 9 of the NLRA
on the basis of speeches made by the employer.' The trend of decisions
of the Nixon Board on the impact of employer statements on union
elections seems consistent with this result. Perhaps in the future empirical research such as that conducted in Chicago will help the Board
stabilize the exercise of its fact-finding role.
[.

MANDATORY SuBjEmCrs OF BARGAINING

Election propaganda is not the only area where important shifts in
labor policy are occurring. One of the clearest changes made by the
new Board has been in the vital area of mandatory subjects of bargain-

ing under section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.5 In GeneralMotors Corp.6 0 the
Nixon Board recently clarified one significant aspect of the employer's
obligation to bargain under this provision, holding that there is no
duty to bargain where management sells the business regardless of
whether the effect is termination of unit jobs. This discussion will
focus on the significance of the GeneralMotors decision, and the shift
it represents in labor policy as developed by previous Boards.
Before reviewing the implications of the General Motors case, however, it is appropriate to recall prior Board philosophy. Before 1962 the
Board held that there was no statutory obligation on the part of the
employer to bargain over basic management decisions.57 The NLRA
Id. at 249.
55 NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
56 191 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 77 LRJ.LR
1537 (1971).
57 Eg., Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1558, 1559 (1961); Brown Truck &
Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 NJ.L.1B. 999, 1000 (1953). In the original Fibreboardconsideration,
the Labor Board in rejecting the idea that the change itself ias a mandatory subject for
64

bargaining said:
Mhe Board has held, the establishment by the Board of an appropriate bargaining
unit does not preclude an employer acting in good faith from making changes in his
business structure, such as entering into subcontracting arrangements, without first
consulting with the representatives of the affected employees.
130 N.L.R.B. at 1560.
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was construed as not covering managerial decisions motivated by the
economics of business operation.58 As a result, decisions to commit
capital or managerial effort to a new product line, or to dispose of inefficient operations were considered basic entrepreneurial rights that
preceded the bargaining duties imposed by the Act.5 9 Thus although an
employer could be held to a duty to bargain on the effects of such
decisions, he did not have to bargain over the decision itself.
This position had serious effects on job security, and many unions
argued that where an employer decision had the effect of terminating
unit jobs it involved "conditions of employment" requiring mandatory
bargaining under the Act.6 0 In 1962 the Kennedy Board accepted this
construction in the companion cases of Town and Country Manufacturing Co.6 ' and FibreboardPaperProducts Corp.,62 extending the duty
to bargain to economically motivated management decisions to subcontract which had the effect of eliminating bargaining unit jobs. 8 These
Board decisions constituted major limitations on the unilateral powers
of management because they required the employer to bargain over the
decision to subcontract itself, and not simply over its effects.
58 The Labor Board commented in Fibreboard:

[A]Ithough the statutory language is broad, we do not believe it is so broad and all
inclusive as to warrant an inference that the Congress intended to compel bargaining
concerning basic management decisions, such as whether and to what extent to risk
capital and managerial effort. Under all the circumstances . . . we conclude that
Section 8(A)(5) of the Act does not obligate the Respondent to bargain ... concern.
ing its economically motivated decision to subcontract its maintenance operations.
130 N.L.R.B. at 1561.
59 E.g., id. at 1560-61.
60 The Supreme Court approved a similar argument under the Railway Labor Act In
Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 362 U.S. 330, 333 (1960). See Platt, The
Duty to Bargain as Applied to Management Decisions, 19 LAB. LJ. 143, 144-47 (1960).
61 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962), enforcement granted, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963). The
employer eliminated drivers' jobs, giving as his reason the alleged problems with I.C.C.
violations and economic considerations. In reversing its previous position the Board said:
In our opinion, the precedents cited and discussed . . . support the conclusion that
the elimination of unit jobs, albeit for economic reasons, is a matter within the
statutory phrase "other terms and conditions of employment" and is a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining within the meaning of section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
Id. at 1027.
62 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962). Relying on Town and Country, the Board said that the
decision to subcontract even for economic reasons was a mandatory subject for bargaining.
63 The basis for this holding was that the changes deemed necessary could be resolved
by frank discussion between labor and management. Such resolution could protect unit
jobs and effectuate the desired management savings. Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136
N.L.R.B. at 1027. "Experience has shown . . . that candid discussion of mutual problems by labor and management frequently results in their resolution with attendant benefit
to both sides." Id.
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The Supreme Court affirmed the Board's Fibreboarddecision,"4 but
added some significant caveats:

We are thus not expanding the scope of mandatory bargaining to
hold, as we do now, that the type of "contracting out" involved
in this case-the replacement of employees in the existing bargaining unit with those of an independent contractor to do the same
work under similar conditions of employment-is a statutory

subject of collective bargaining under § 8(d). Our decision need
not and does not encompass other forms of "contracting out" or
"subcontracting" which arise daily in our complex economy.0 5
Perhaps concerned that even this limiting language was not precise
enough, Mr. Justice Stewart wrote a further explanation in his concurring opinion. Observing that there are many managerial decisions imperiling job security that would not be the subject of collective
bargaining, he stated that "[d]ecisions concerning the commitment of
investment capital and the basic scope of the enterprise"'0 are not subjects of collective bargaining, regardless of their impact on employment.
Such decisions, Justice Stewart noted, lie at the "core of entrepreneurial
7
control."6
This explanation of managerial decision making has become increasingly significant because it is contrary to the expansive reading that the
Kennedy-Johnson Board later gave to the majority holding in Fibreboard.68 Taking the position that any decision having major effects on
unit jobs should be a mandatory subject of bargaining, the Board attempted to extend section 8(a)(5) into many additional areas. For example, in Star Baby Co.69 the Board held that there was a duty to bargain over the decision to sell the assets of a business where the employer
had decided to dissolve its partnership. Similarly, in Royal Platingand
Polishing Co.70 the Board extended the duty to bargain to the
sale of facilities that resulted in the partial dosing of the employer's
64
65
66
67
68

Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
Id. at 215.
Id. at 223.
Id.

The Board construed the holding broadly to apply to any change in operations vhich
had the effect of eliminating unit jobs. E.g., Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.LR.B. 561 (1967).
The courts of appeals on the other hand relied heavily on Stewart's concurring opinion to
restrict such efforts by the Board. See note 77 infra.
69 140 N.L.R.B. 678 (1963).
70 148 N.L.R.B. 545 (1964), enforcement denied, 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965). See Schnell
Tool & Die Corp., 162 N.LR.B. 1313 (1967).
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business. Other decisions of the Kennedy-Johnson Board required
employers to bargain before they transferred work from one plant to
another, 1 or before they suspended their distribution system in favor
72
of independent contractors.
In all these decisions, the Board's criterion for determining whether
bargaining would be mandatory for a management decision was the
effect of that decision on unit jobs.78 This approach was deemed consistent with the Supreme Court holding in Fibreboard, which the
Board interpreted as cov&ring decisions involving plant closings and
removals as well as subcontracting. This expansive interpretation was
criticized by some7 4 as violating the limitations in Fibreboard,but in
Ozark Trailers,Inc.75 the Board defended its basic rationale stating:
[A]n employer's decision to make a "major" change in the nature
of his business, such as the termination of a portion thereof, is
also of significance for those employees whose jobs will be lost
by the termination. For, just as the employer has invested capital
in the business, so the employee has invested years of his working
life, accumulating seniority, accruing pension rights, and developing skills that may or may not be salable to another employer.
And, just as the employer's interest in the protection of his
capital is entitled to consideration in our interpretation of the
Act, so too is the employee's interest in the protection of his livelihood.7 6
Although the Board could give the Supreme Court's holding such
a broad interpretation, the courts of appeals could not. Board orders
expanding the duty to bargain over management decisions were consistently reversed by the appellate courts--who gave more consideration
71 Shell Oil Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 305 (1964).
72 Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964).

78 In Kennecott Copper Corp., 148 N.L.RB. 1653 (1964), for example, the decision to
subcontract rebuilding of a mobile mining machine where no jobs were lost and
employees worked forty hour weeks was not held to be a violation. A violation was
found, however, where an employer closed down his plant and moved it 150 miles without
first bargaining with the union. Standard Handkerchief Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 15 (1965).
74 See, e.g., note 77 infra.
75 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1967). Three companies with interlocking owners and operations

decided to close the portion manufacturing truck bodies about a year after that plant had
unionized. The reasons given were economic-that contracting out would be less costly.
The union, however, had been told that the closing was due to lack of work and only
temporary.
76 Id. at 566.
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than the Board to the majority's caveats and Justice Stewart's concurrence 71
Apparently acquiescing in these court decisions, the Nixon Board in
GeneralMotors Corp.,78 held there was no duty to bargain over a transaction involving the sale of the employer's business. Like the decision
in Star Baby Co., 79 the Board faced a sale which meant termination of
employee jobs. The operation of the company was sold as a franchise
with the new owner continuing to act as a GMG dealer. The union had
notice that negotiations were taking place and had asked to be present.
The sale was completed and notice was given by the new owners that
the change would not permit continued employment of unit workers.
Although dearly a parallel of such earlier decisions as Star Baby80 and
Ozark Trailers,Inc.,8 1 the Board chose to follow the decisions of the
courts and exclude the sale from the scope of 8(a)(5):
We believe.., that this issue is controlled by the rationale the
courts have generally adopted in closely related cases, that decisions as this, in which a significant investment or withdrawal of
capital will affect the scope and ultimate direction of an enterprise,
are matters essentially financial and managerial in nature. They
thus lie at the very core of entrepreneurial control, and are not
the types of subjects which Congress intended to encompass within
"rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or other conditions of
employment."8 12
Other Board decisions have found special circumstances exempting
unilateral decisions from bargaining even where subcontracting was at
issue.83
77 E.g., NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1965);

NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Drapery
Mfg. Co., 425 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1965). The court in Adams Dairy relied heavily on
Stewart's opinion when it declared:
In Adams Dairy there is a change in basic operating procedure in that the dairy
liquidated that part of its business handling distribution of milk products. Unlike the

situation in Fibreboard,there was a change in the capital structure of Adams Dairy
which resulted in a partial liquidation and recoup of capital investment.
350 F.2d at 111.
78 191 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 77 L.R.R.M. 1537 (1971).
79 140 N.L.RB. 678 (1963).
80 Id.
81 161 N.L.RB. 561 (1967). See, e.g., Adams Dairy, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964).
82 77 LR.R.M. at 1559.

83 E.g., Tellepsen Petro-Chem Constructors, 190 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 77 LR.I L 1235
(1971). See Summit Tooling Co., 195 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 79 ILR.1L 1396 (1972) (duty to
bargain not imposed despite discriminatory motive for dosing).
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These recent decisions suggest that the Board is now willing to
comply with the Supreme Court's restrictive holding in Fibreboard.
Subsequent to Fibreboard, the Board had increasingly required employers to bargain with their union representatives when there was a
management decision affecting the length of employment, regardless of
how crucial that decision was to the successful operation of the employer's business. In reestablishing a distinction between subjects appropriate for employee bargaining and those falling within an area that
should be exclusively within management control, the Board has recognized that the requirement to bargain should not significantly abridge
the employer's freedom to manage his business. Thus the General
Motors decision has reconciled the conflict between the Board's expansive interpretation of Fibreboardduring the Kennedy-Johnson administration, and the persistent judicial limitations on that interpretation
by the Supreme Court and many appellate courts. As a result, Fibreboard seems to be valid today only in the narrowest sense.

III.

DEFERRAL TO ARBITRATION

In no area has policy change been more significant in scope or implication than in the area of the Board's deferral to arbitration. Beginning
with Collyer Insulated Wire,8 4 and extending through a series of recent
cases, the Nixon Board has embarked upon a new policy that continues
to unfold. These cases represent more than a mere change in the
Board's exercise of its statutory discretion. At stake are more fundamental issues and interests. Indeed, there are those who argue that Collyer represents not merely a change but rather an abdication of the
Board's statutory role. Even if one agrees that the Board is acting
within its discretion in adopting the deferral policy of Collyer, there
still remain significant policy questions with regard to the very process
to which the Board is deferring-namely labor arbitration. The Coilyer majority seems to have adopted the popular wisdom of the Supreme
Court in the Steelworkers Trilogy,8 5 yet the wisdom of relying upon the
arbitral process to protect and enforce statutory rights which may have
become entwined with questions of contract interpretation remain unproven. The basic premise of Steelworkers-that parties should be
84 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971). For a view contrary to that expressed in this section, see Miller, Deferral to Arbitration-Temperance or Abstinence? 7
GA. L. REv. 595 (1973).
85 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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allowed to resolve their contractual disputes in private forums of their
own choosing, even to the point of excluding resort to the courtshardly supports any suggestion that employers and unions, by means of
a collective bargaining contract, should be able to insulate themselves
from the provisions of the NLRA and the national policies which it is
intended to effectuate. Likewise, even if the logic of Steelworkers-that
arbitrators are as well suited to interpreting collective bargaining agreements as the courts-is conceded, it is not at all certain that arbitrators
have the expertise or even the inclination to decide or enforce statutory
issues and policies which long have been entrusted to the expertise of
the Board. 6
Before discussing Collyer and its offspring it is necessary to consider
briefly the historical background of the Board's policy on deferral to
arbitration in the factual situation presented in Collyer;s 7 that is, a
situation in which the grievance-arbitration machinery is available but
has not yet been invoked by the parties. In this type of case, the Board
is deferring not to an arbitration award or pending proceeding but
86 Lest this somewhat jaundiced introduction of Collyer be mistaken for an overprotective concern for the Board's role and its jurisdiction, the author wishes to add that
his views in this area stem from his experiences as an arbitrator. This discussion will
attempt to analyze Collyer from the perspective of the arbitrator.
87 The NLRB's policy on deferral to arbitration has formed around two other types
of factual situations: that in which arbitration had been involved and an award made,
and that in which arbitration and Board processes were invoked simultaneously.
With respect to post-award situations in which charges were filed after the arbitration
award, the Board announced in Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (1946), that
it would dismiss unfair labor practice charges filed after the conclusion of arbitration pro-

ceedings in which a determination had been made on the merits. In its subsequent
decision in Spielberg Manufacturing Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955), the Board handed
down guidelines for the honoring of arbitration amards rendered prior to the filing of
charges before the Board. In such situations the Board stated that it would dismiss unfair
labor practice complaints arising from disputes wherein the arbitration proceedings
"appear to have been fair and regular, all parties had agreed to be bound, and the decision
... is not dearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the AcL" Id. at 1082. In Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963), rev'd, 326 F.2d 471 (Ist Cir. 19641), the Board added a
fourth criterion to its Spielberg doctrine by holding that the unfair labor practice issue
presented in the post-award complaint must have been presented to and considered by the
arbitrator.
In the related but factually different situation in which the arbitral process is available
and has been involved but no award has issued before resort to the Board, the Board's
policies have been less dear. Where parties have attempted to utilize grievance-arbitration
machinery while simultaneously pressing charges before the Board, the cases have gone
both ways. In some instances the Board has deferred to arbitration while in others it has
proceeded to an adjudication despite the pendency of other proceedings. Comspare Hercules
Motor Corp., 136 N.LYLB. 1648 (1962), with Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142 N.LR.B. 431 (1963).
See also note 99 infra.
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rather to the available arbitration process upon which the parties have
contractually agreed.
A.

Pre-CollyerDevelopments

The Board's first decision evidencing deference to an available arbitration process was ConsolidatedAircraft Corp.,8 8 wherein the Board
in 1943 held that it would refrain from deciding any question of con-

tract interpretation which is capable of being resolved under grievance
and arbitration procedures. This deferral principle was subsequently

applied in a number of instances by the Board, 89 even including cases
in which no arbitration was available to the parties. t0

Almost twenty years later, however, the policy announced in Consolidated Aircraft was called into serious question by the KennedyJohnson Board's holding in C & C Plywood Corp."' There the Board
construed a disputed contract provision 2 involving the right of an employer to make unilateral wage changes, rather than deferring to an

available grievance procedure. Although the case could be distinguished from Consolidated Aircraft on the fact that there was grievance

machinery but no ultimate arbitration process available to the parties,
this did not diminish the force of the majority's commentary on the
Board's involvement in contract interpretation. After noting that the
Board was not unfamiliar with problems of contract interpretation,
the majority rejected the argument that the Board should dismiss a

complaint when the validity of a claim involves construction of a col88 47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943). In Consolidated, the employer had unilaterally changed a
number of wage rates and conditions of employment during the term of the contract
without notifying the union. When the union filed an unfair labor practice charge with.
out utilizing the grievance-arbitration machinery, the Board refused to rule on the refusalto-bargain charge. The Board stated that the parties had already agreed upon a method
of contract administration and interpretation which the Board's interference could only
undermine. Id. at 706. Also, the Board relied upon the facts that the employer did not
appear to be trying to undermine the union, that their collective bargaining relationship
had been successful in the past, and that the employer remained ready to bargain with
the union after its objections were made known. Id. at 705.
89 E.g., Flintkote Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 1561 (1964); Bemis Bros. Bag Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 1311
(1963); United Tel. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 779 (1955); McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 109 N.L.R.B.
930 (1954).
90 E.g., Midland Broadcasting Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 455, 457 (1951).
91 148 N.L.R.B. 414 (1964), enforcement denied, 351 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 385
U.S. 421 (1967). In C & C Plywood, the employer interpreted a contract provision as permitting him to change rates of pay without notification to the union. He was subsequently
charged with refusal to bargain, and the Board found that he had no contractual right
to make the unilateral wage changes at issue.
92 See note 91 supra.
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lective bargaining contract.9 3 Following C & C Plywood the Board refused to defer decision in several cases involving unilateral action
during the term of a collective bargaining agreement. 4 Despite some
vacillation over the rationale announced in that case, the change in
policy soon became unmistakable. During the period from 1960 to
1968, the Board refused to defer to the arbitrators in 16 out of 20
pre-award cases involving questions of unilateral action by the employer and contract interpretation.9 5
With the advent of the Nixon administration and new appointments
to the Board came a departure from the Kennedy-Johnson Board's
policy of non-deferral in pre-award cases. The forerunner of Collyer
and its deferral policy in pre-award cases was Joseph Schlitz Brewing
Co. 98 In Schlitz, the union had filed an 8(a)(5) charge in response to
the employer's unilateral change of its past practice of using relief
workers to fill in for regular employees during breaktime. Neither
party had initiated the grievance and arbitration machinery provided
for in the collective bargaining contract at the time charges were filed
with the Board. In opting for deferral to arbitration of the dispute,
the Board apparently relied upon four factors in the Schlitz situation:
(1) the contract dearly provided for grievance and arbitration machinery; (2) the unilateral action taken was not designed to undermine
the union; (3) the action was not patently erroneous, but rather, was
based on a substantial claim of contractual privilege; and (4) it appeared that the arbitral interpretation of the contract -would resolve
both the unfair labor practice issue and the contract interpretation issue in a manner compatible with the purposes of the Act.97 Other
factors cited by the Board as contributing to the appropriateness of
deferral in Schlitz were the parties long and successful bargaining relationships; the absence of allegations of other unlawful conduct; the
good faith nature of the dispute; and the fact that the employer had
urged arbitration and offered to discuss the matter before taking action. 8 What the Schlitz decision meant in terms of future policy on

deferral was not immediately apparent since it was decided by only a
93

148 N.LR.B. at 416.

94 See, e.g., Huttig Sash & Door Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 811 (1965), enforced, 577 F.2d 964

(8th Cir. 1967); Century Papers, Inc., 155 N.LR.B. 358 (1965).
95 See Menard, The National Labor Relations Board-No Longer a Threat to the Arbitral Process?, 23 LAE. I. J. 140, 144 n.35 (1972).
96 175 N.L.1B. 141 (1969).
97 Id. at 142.
98 Id.
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three-member panel and was rather inconsistently followed thereafter.0
It remained for the full Board in Collyer Insulated Wire to reaffirm
the doctrine of Schlitz and set the Board's "policy in similar cases in
the future."' 00
The Collyer Decision

B.

The factual situation of Collyer Insulated Wire,'0 ' reduced to its
operative elements, involved certain changes in wage rates and job
assignments which the employer claimed were sanctioned by the existing collective bargaining agreement. The changes made were "unilateral" in the sense that the union had not acceded to them, but the
employer had discussed them prior to their initiation and remained
willing to discuss the changes after they were made. Though a
grievance-arbitration process was available, the union did not resort
to it but fied unfair labor practices charges with the Board.
Confronted with this pre-award situation in which the parties had
not utilized the grievance-arbitration procedures available to them, the
three-member majority in Collyer cited Consolidated Aircraft Corp.02
and its offspring' 0 3 and concluded that the Board's deferral to the parties' established grievance arbitration procedure would best serve the
policy of promoting industrial peace through collective bargaining.1 01
The Board retained jurisdiction for the purpose of possible further
consideration of the charges if the parties did not pursue arbitration
with reasonable promptness or if the award rendered in arbitration did
not meet the criteria of fairness, regularity, and consistency with the
Act required in Spielberg ManufacturingCo.' 05 In essence, the majority
applied the Spielberg doctrine prospectively in the sense that deferral
was made conditional upon the subsequent award's validity under the
Spielberg guidelines. 0 6
99 See, e.g., Cello-Foil Prod., Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. 676 (1969); Dresser Indus. Valve &
Instrument Div., 178 N.L.R.B. 317 (1969); Zenith Radio Corp., 177 N.L.R.B. 360 (1969);
Boston Edison Co., 176 N.L.R.B. 942 (1969).
100 Address by Chairman Edward B. Miller, Western States Employer Ass'n Conference,
Pebble Beach, California, August 27, 1971.
101 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 177 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).

47 N.L.RB. 694 (1943).
103 See cases collected at 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1936 n.11 (1971).
104 Id. at 1936.
105 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
106 Members Fanning and Jenkins dissented vigorously in Collyer as they have done In
102

virtually every Collyer-type case which they have considered since. Their disagreement
with the policy announced in Collyer seems to stem primarily from their different perceptions of the Board's role, its discretion in limiting its statutory responsibility, and Its
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Immediately after Collyer was decided, it was difficult to determine
its impact and the breadth of the deferral policy announced there. But
with the replacement of Member Brown, who concurred in Collyer,
by Member Penello, the Board acquired a solid majority which has
recently moved to apply the deferral policy of Collyer far beyond the
factual circumstances of that case and the 8(a)(5) charges involved in
both Schlitz and Collyer. A look at the rapidly expanding Collyer
policy of arbitration deferral will serve not only to survey the substantive aspects of the policy as it is now being applied but also to
emphasize the dramatic departure from prior Board practices and attitudes toward arbitration. The cases used to assess the reach of Collyer
are only examples. While they do not illustrate all the subtle nuances
of development in this area, they do represent the current farthest
reaches of the Board's new deferral policy and the significant change
107
which it represents.
C. Post-CollyerDevelopments
Since the purpose of this discussion is to highlight changes in Board
policy, all the facts or reasoning of the cases which have extended the
Collyer Wire decision will not be reviewed. With respect to deferral
in 8(a)(5) situations, the cases have been numerous enough to establish with some certainty the Board's new policy. In some areas, the
cases have been too few to draw many conclusions beyond noting the
Board's willingness to defer to arbitration in the face of such charges.
However, the overall trend is toward expansion of the Collyer policy
into areas not previously the subject of deferral and a permissive application of the criteria for deferral outlined in Collyer.
1. Section 8(b)(8) cases-Collyer Insulated Wire and Schlitz Brewing Co. both involved Board deferral to arbitration in the face of 8(a)(5)
charges. Whether the Board would defer in the case of analogous secdon 8(b)(3)10 s charges was answered in National Biscuit Co.1°0 In this
case the union was charged with refusing to be bound by provisions of
expertise. Beyond these considerations concerning the Board and the Act, Members Fanning and Jenkins seem reluctant to subscribe to the efficacious view of arbitration espoused
in the Steelworker's Trilogy, cases cited note 85 supra, especially where unfair labor practices beyond refusals to bargain have been alleged.

107 Chairman Miller also discusses some of the cases which have significantly expanded
Collyer in Miller, Deferral to Arbitration-Temperanceor Abstinence?, 7 GA. L. RV. 595
(1973). The Chairman views this policy of expansion as sound "both in the immediate
legal sense and in the sense of long-term ...administration of the Act." rd. at 602.
108 NLRA § 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1970).
109 198 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 80 L..R.IAL 1727 (1972).
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the contract requiring the employer's drivers to make cash collections,
and with unilaterally altering terms and conditions of employment by
directing and requiring drivers to cease making cash collections. The
union was also charged with violating section 8(b)(1)(A)11 ° by threatening the union drivers with fines and loss of membership if they did
not cease making cash collections. Even though the contract did not
compel arbitration unless both parties agreed, the Board, with Members Fanning and Jenkins dissenting, dismissed the charges and left
the parties to resolve the dispute through their contractual machinery."' Thus it appears that the Board is equally willing to defer
to arbitration whether the alleged conduct constitutes an 8(a)(5) or an
8(b)(8) violation.
One aspect of National Biscuit worthy of further mention is the nature of the machinery to which the Board deferred in that case. Unlike
Collyer, in which the majority implied that the available arbitration
process must be an exclusive and compulsory procedure to warrant
deferral, 112 the contract in National Biscuit required only the mandatory submission of disputes to a bipartite panel of union and employer representatives which had authority to make the final decision
as to whether arbitration would be invoked. 18 By deferring to arbitration in this situation, the Board extended the logic of Collyer to the
point of deferring to a process that was "nonexistent" in the sense that
the parties had not only not agreed to arbitration, but also had shunned
it to the extent of establishing a bipartite panel to avoid it or limit its
application. 114 Whether the present Board will extend its deferral policy to other types of dispute machinery short of arbitration remains to
be seen. The circumstances of National Biscuit certainly seem to have
opened the door to such a course.
2. Section 8(a)(3) cases-Until July, 1972, the Board's policy of deferral to arbitration was not clear with respect to 8(a)(8) charges. In
Tulsa-Whisenhunt Funeral Homes, Inc.,1 5 the Board refused to dismiss 8(a)(3) charges and defer to arbitration on the grounds that the
collective bargaining agreement did not provide for final and binding
arbitration. Thus the Board did not reach the question of when the
Collyer deferral policy would be applicable and appropriate with re-

110 NLRA

§ 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970).
Ill 198 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 80 L.R.ILM. at 1730.

112 See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1936 (1971).
118 198 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 80 L.R.R.M. 1727, 1729 (1972).
114 Id. at 1731 (Fanning and Jenkins, Members, dissenting).
115 195 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 79 L.R.R.M. 1265 (1972).
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spect to alleged violations of section 8(a)(3). 116 The answer came in
three cases decided in July, 1972.
In NationalRadio Co.,1 7 the employer was charged with unilaterally
imposing a requirement that union representatives record and report
their movements in the plant while processing grievances on company
time, and with disciplining and subsequently discharging an employee
who refused to comply with these reporting requirements. The Board
dismissed the 8(a)(5) charge on the rationale of Collyer. The 8(a)(3)
charge, however, was substantially different from the factual situation
of Collyer in that the employer's actions toward the discharged employee were alleged to have been motivated by anti-union animus." 8
In justifying dismissal of the 8(a)(3) charge and deferral to arbitration
in a context admittedly different from Collyer, the Board relied upon
several grounds. The majority first noted that the Board is "empowered
under the statute to defer action on a complained of violation of
Sections 8(a)(1) and (3), pending arbitration, if, on balance, to do so
will advance the policies and purposes of the Act." 110 Implicit in this
conclusion was what the majority termed the "tenable assumption' 2"0
that the arbitration proceeding will lead to a resolution of the dispute
which will not be repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act.
In support of this assumption the majority noted that the interests of
the employee and his union were in substantial harmony, that the
intersection of such interests was likely in every such case, and that
there was no basis for believing that the discharged employee's interests
would be inadequately represented under contractual procedures.' -'
The majority reinforced its conclusion with two further observations.
First, as in Collyer and Schlitz, the parties had a long-established and
stable bargaining relationship. Second, although anti-union animus was
allegedly the respondent's motivation for discharge, the majority distinguished the facts of National Radio from cases in which a history

or pattern of animus toward the exercise of section 8(a)(3) rights had
been alleged.122
116 Id. at 1267.
117 198 N.L.R.E. No. 1, 80 L.R.R._M 1718 (1972).
118 Id. at 1721.
119 Id. at 1722.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1723-24.
122 Id. at 1724. Members Fanning and Jenkins registered a strong dissent to the majority's
expansion of Collyer. Citing reasons in addition to those put forward in earlier dissents,

the dissenters argued that "[t]o compel the victim of ... alleged discrimination to resort
to arbitration is not 'deferral,' but a subcontracting to a private tribunal of the determina-
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Appalachian Power Co.,123 the second case of Board deferral involving 8(a)(3) charges, was concerned with the revocation of a contractual
leave of absence permitting an employee to serve as a full-time representative of certain local unions. After the employee had successfully
organized an affiliated plant, the respondent revoked the employee's
leave of absence with the explanation that his activity was contrary
to the letter and intent of the contract provision under which the
leave had been granted. The union invoked the arbitration provisions
of the contract which called for one management and one union representative to select a neutral third party to complete the three-member
arbitration panel. While the selection of a third arbitrator was pending, the unfair labor practice charges which had been filed by the union
during the last stage of the grievance procedure were heard and decided. The trial examiner, finding anti-union motivation behind the
cancelling of the leave of absence, concluded that the employer had
violated sections 8(a)(1) and (3). A majority of the Board disagreed,
reasoning that since the essential issue was one of contract interpreta1 24
tion, Collyer principles warranted deferral to arbitration.
The third case in which the Board extended its Collyer deferral
tion of rights conferred and guaranteed solely by the statute." Id. Fanning and Jenkins
further noted that statutory protection against 8(a)(3) violations is an individual right,
unlike the union or group right to be protected from 8(a)(5) violations such as unilateral
changes in the collective bargaining agreement. Thus the dissenters argued that rights
granted by the Act to individuals cannot be reduced, altered, or displaced by agreements
between the union and employer. The dissent further argued that arbitrators, In their
preoccupation with determining whether "good cause" or "just cause" existed for a discharge, might well ignore the fact that the true reason for the employee's discharge was
his union activity. Such a reduction of the issues to a question of good or just cause for
discharge would strip the employee of his statutory protection. Id. at 1725. Finally, Members Fanning and Jenkins concluded that, under the majority's rationale, the end result
would enable parties to contract themselves out of the Act to any extent they choose by
listing in the contract the provisions of the Act they agree not to violate, and appending an
arbitration clause to such a listing. Id. at 1726.
123 198 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 80 L.R.R.M. 1731 (1972).
124 Id. at 1784. Again, Members Fanning and Jenkins dissented. They first commented
on the fact that the majority's decision was based solely on the respondent's interpretation
of the contract as prohibiting an employee from engaging in organizing activities while
on leave. Id. at 1735. They argued that this result ignored the violations of 8(a)(1) and (3)
as found by the trial examiner without even attempting to interpret the clause in question
or judge the reasonableness of the respondent's interpretation. Going further, the dissenters
argued that the contract clause, as interpreted by the employer and accepted by the
majority, amounted to a waiver by the union of the employee's section 7 rights-a waiver
which the majority found not inherently destructive of statutory rights. Finally, Members
Fanning and Jenkins accused the majority of accepting such a waiver despite the long
line of authority holding that a waiver of statutory rights must lie stated in clear and
unmistakable terms. Id.
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policy to cases involving 8(a)(3) charges is National Tea Co.= There
the employer was charged with discharging two employees who, in
protest of what they believed was an unreasonably short break period,
instigated an unauthorized strike. The employer based its action on a
contract clause which on its face allowed the employer to impose
discipline short of discharge within the first twenty-four hours after an
unauthorized work stoppage and allowed the employer to discharge
employees striking beyond the first tventy-four hour period. Though
the strike had lasted less than twenty-four hours, the two employees
who had instigated it were discharged. Grievances were filed and eventually resolved in the third step of the grievance procedure. The fourth
step in the grievance procedure, binding arbitration, was not reached.
The trial examiner recommended dismissal of the complaint after finding that it would be appropriate to defer to the award of the "joint
committee" which had heard the grievance in its third stage and had
upheld the discharge of the two employees. The majority upheld the
trial examiner's deferral on the basis of the Spielberg guidelines without reaching the merits.
3. Section 8(a)(1) cases-The Nixon majority has extended Collyer
to 8(a)(1) cases, such as Joseph T. Ryerson & Sons'2 0 and Tyee Construction Co.,'-7 on basically the same rationale used in the 8(a)(3)
area. At the same time there are several cases in this area in which the
Board has refused to defer to arbitration on the ground that
the interests of the charging parties were in apparent conflict with
those of the union and the employer. Kansas Meat Packers, 2 Pauley
125 198 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 80 L.R.RI.M. 1786 (1972). Members Fanning and Jenkins dissented on the ground that the majority had not even considered whether the allegedly
"unauthorized strike" had been protected activity. Noting that strikes over unfair labor

practices may be protected even though not authorized by a union, the dissenters argued
that the contract provisions in question purported to give the employer the right to fire
any strikers so long as the strike was "unauthorized." This, they claimed, ignored the
Board's previous holding in Wagoner Transportation Co., 177 N.L.R.B. 452 (1969). enforced
per curiam, 424 F.2d 628 (6th Cir. 1970), in which the Board had held in the case of an
almost identical contract clause that strikes of less than 24 hours duration were protected

activity under section 7 of the Act. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). To the dissenters,
the majority's blind acceptance of the Joint Committee's decision in the face of this prior
authority amounted to a "patent abdication of the Board's statutory responsibility" and a
complete emasculation of the principles of Spielberg Manufacturing Co., 198 N.L.1B.
No. 62, 80 LR.R.M. 1736, 1737-38 (1972) (Fanning and Jenkins, Members, dissenting).
126 199 NJ.R.B. No. 44, 81 L.RLLRM 1261 (1972) (deferred to arbitration). The majority

indicated that deferral would be inappropriate where the conduct in question undermines
the grievance-arbitration process itself.
127 202 N.L.R.B. No. 34, 82 L.R.R.M. 1548 (1973) (deferral to arbitration).
128 198 N.L.1.B. No. 2, 80 L.1R.ML.

1743 (1972).
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Paving Co., 129 and Anaconda Wire Cable Co., 8 0 are among those cases
in which the Board has held that it would be repugnant to the purposes
of the NLRA to relegate employees to an arbitral process that is
authored, administered and invoked entirely by parties hostile to their
interests. In Kansas Meat Packers,'8 two employees were allegedly fired
for engaging in protected activity in the form of pressing grievances
which neither the union nor the employer acted upon. When the employer urged the Board to defer the matter to an available arbitration
process under the contract, the Board refused on the ground that the
interests of the charging parties were in apparent conflict with those of
the union and the employer. An added factor was the refusal of the
discharged employees to submit their cause to the grievance-arbitration
process. In refusing to dismiss the 8(a)(1) charges the Board held that it
would be repugnant to the purposes of the Act to force employees to
submit to an arbitral process that is controlled by hostile parties.8 2
Thus Kansas Meat Packers and subsequent cases represent the opposite
side of the "substantial harmony of interest" question considered in
National Radio, 33 in which the majority found the intersection of employee and union interests to be a factor in favor of deferral to the
arbitral process. These cases provide good examples of the Board majority's inclination to apply the same criteria and reasoning to deferral
whether the cases present 8(a)(1) or 8(a)(8) violations or both.
4. Other areas-The Nixon majority has extended the Collyer
deferral doctrine to other unfair labor practice situations, but the cases
have been fewer and the trends in these areas are less clear.
(a) Section 8(a)(2) cases-The Nixon Board has evidenced a reluctance to defer to arbitration in two cases, Ipco Hospital Supply Corp.184
and Scottex Corp.,8 5 directly involving 8(a)(2) charges. In the Ipco case,
for example, it was alleged that the employer violated section 8(a)(2)1 10
129

200 N.L.R.B. No. 124, 82 L.R.R.M. 1005 (1972).

130 201 N.L.R.B. No. 125, 82 LR.R.M. 1419 (1973).

198 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 80 LR.R.M. 1743 (1972).
Id.
133 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718, 1723 (1972). Fleet Carrier Corp., 201 N.L.R.B.
No. 29, 82 L.R.R.M. 1178 (1973) is a recent example of non-deferral in an 8(a)(3) situation
which lacked the substantial harmony of interests present in National Radio.
134 195 N.L.R.B. No. 182, 79 L.R.R.M. 1641 (1972).
135 200 N.L.R1B. No. 75, 82 L.R.R.M. 1287 (1972).
130 NLRA § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1970). This sections provides in part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer181
132

(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it ....
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by continuing to recognize a union as the exclusive bargaining representative of its clerical employees at a new facility, by bargaining with
the union, and by threatening clerical employees with discharge if they
failed to join. When urged to defer to a pending arbitration proceed.
ing, the trial examiner refused deferral on the ground that the matter
of recognition was a question exclusively for the Board. The trial exam.er concluded that any decision by an arbitrator indicating the
union's exclusive representative status and its claim to the benefits of a
union security provision at issue would be clearly repugnant to the
purpose of the Act and not entitled to acceptance. The Board affirmed
the trial examiner's finding of an 8(a)(2) violation.
However, another case 137 not specifically presenting an 8(a)(2) complaint indicates that the Board might be willing to defer to arbitration
in other situations in which an 8(a)(2) charge is involved. In Urban N.
Patman, Inc., 3s the respondent had gradually added a sizeable precooked foods operation to its original sausage manufacturing operation.
Although the pre-cooked food employees had never been formally organized nor the union which represented the sausage employees recognized as the bargaining agent for the pre-cooked food employees, the
employer had followed a practice of paying the pre-cooked food employees the union scale. When competitive pressures made this unfeasible, the employer sought to reduce the average scale for these
employees, but the union would not agree to the reduction. Afterward
the employer unilaterally reduced wages in the pre-cooked foods department. The trial examiner deemed the pre-cooked food department
an accretion to the existing unit, found violations of sections 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(5), and determined that the issue was not arbitrable within
the terms of the contract. The Board majority disagreed and reasoned
that the essence of the dispute was whether the present contract covered
the pre-cooked foods department. Having framed the issue in terms of
contract interpretation, the majority deemed the issue appropriate for
deferral under the principles of Collyer even though the collective
bargaining agreement indicated that the parties had not intended arbitration of wage disputes. 139
137 Urban N. Patman, Inc., 197 N.L.RB. No. 150, 80 IALILM. 1481 (1972).
138 Id.

139 Id. at 1482. For a case indicating that the Board may not be as willing to defer to
arbitration in the case. of 8(a)(2) complaints as Patman might suggest, see Combustion
Engineering, Inc., 195 N.L.RLB. No. 161, 79 LR.R.M. 1577 (1972). In that case the employer
was charged with violating section 8(a)(3) when it announced to employees of its new
plant that they were subject to the provisions of a union contract covering the employer's
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Although Patman did not involve an 8(a)(2) complaint, it was concerned with elements of possible employer support or interference
which could have formed the basis of 8(a)(2) charges. Thus, as the
foregoing discussion suggests, Board policy on deferral in this area,
although unclear, apparently depends on whether a central issue involves a unit determination or representation question. If it does, the
Board will not defer.140 On the other hand, if the issue is not so much
the appropriateness of the unit as it is contract coverage, Board deferral
to arbitration may be likely.
(b) Section 8(b) cases-On the question of the Board's willingness to
defer to arbitration when confronted with 8(b) union unfair labor practice charges, the cases have been too few to draw conclusions. As to
unfair labor practices against members, the most important single
factor in such cases would seem to be the harmony of interest between
the union and its members. In National Radio Co.,' the Board deferred to arbitration where confronted with an 8(b)(1)(A)142 charge
because among other factors, there was "substantial harmony" between
the interests of the union and the employees involved. Where there is
a conflict of union and employee interests, however, as in Kansas Meat
Packers,143 and Communications Workers Local 1197,144 the Board has
refused to defer to arbitration. In Laborers Local 573,145 for example,
the Board refused to defer to arbitration in the face of 8(b)(1)(A) and
8(b)(2) charges with the explanation that deferral is inappropriate
where the interests of the employees were adverse to those of the employer and the union.
nearby plant. Pursuant to a grievance filed by the union, an arbitrator found that the
new plant was a "normal accretion" to the existing plant and concluded that the new
plant employees were covered by the contract. In refusing deferral to the arbitrator's
decision, the Board held that it was the obligation of the Board to determine whether the
new employees constituted an accretion to the existing unit. The Board agreed with the
trial examiner's finding that the new employees did not constitute an accretion to the
existing unit. Even though this case involved an 8(a)(3) charge and concerned deferral to
an arbitration award, it does seem to indicate the Board's unwillingness to defer to
arbitration in the case of possible 8(a)(2) violations.
140 See note 139 supra.
141 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718 (1972).
142 NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A) (1970). This section provides:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed In
section 157 of this title ....

143 198 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 80 L.R.R.M. 1743 (1972). See p. 632 supra.
144 202 N.L.R.B. No. 45, 82 L.R.R.M. 1530 (1973).
145 196 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 80 L.R.R.M. 1329 (1972).
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Two cases have presented the Board with an opportunity to defer to
arbitration when an unfair labor practice against an employee under
8(b)(1)(B)146 is involved. In Sheet Metal Workers Local 17,147 the Board
refused to dismiss 8(b)(l)(B) charges and defer to arbitration where the
union had fined a member for allegedly working for less than the area
wage scale at a time when he had been employed as a supervisor. The
Board noted that an arbitrator, in dealing with the question of whether
the supervisor was covered by the contract, would not have to consider
the issue which faced the Board-namely, whether the worker involved
was a "supervisor" or "employee" within the meaning of the NLRA.
Since the Board deemed it necessary to take jurisdiction in order to
determine whether the union fine violated the Act, the Board saw
less reason to defer other issues in the case to arbitration. Citing relitigation of issues in different forums as a situation which deferral
was designed to avoid, the Board stated that since it must resolve the
validity of the union fine, "there is far less compelling reason for not
48
permitting the entire dispute to be resolved in a single proceeding."'
In Mailers Union,1 49 another 8(b)(1)(B) case, the Board deferred to
arbitration. There the union was charged with restraining and coercing
the employer in the selection of its representative for the purpose of
collective bargaining by fining the employer's foreman, also a union
member, for performing an act within the scope of his supervisory
authority. In deferring the dispute to the available arbitration process,
the Board noted that the contract specifically covered the type of union
fine in question and that nothing in the Act prohibited an employer and
a labor organization from voluntarily resolving in their contract how
a broadly stated legislative policy in 8(b)(1)(B) should function in their
particular circumstances. Thus the majority deferred under the prindples of Collyer.150
146 NURA § 8(b)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1970).
147 199 N.LR.B. No. 26, 81 L.R.R.M. 1195 (1972).

148 Id. at 1198.
149 199 N.LYLB. No. 69, 81 LR.R.M. 1310 (1972).
150 Members Fanning and Jenkins, in dissenting, noted that the Board's majority was

deferring when it could very easily decide the case on the full record presently before it
without interpreting the contract or requiring the expertise of an arbitrator. Id. at 1811.
Essentially, the dissenters did not find the contract and its meaning to be at the center
of the dispute as in Collyer. The dissenters further argued that the majority's decision
merely confirmed what they had predicted in National Radio Co., 198 N.LR.B. No. 1, 80
LR.R.M. 1718, 1726 (1972), would be the result of the Collyer principle--that "by incorporating the provisions of the Act into the contract and then appending an arbitration
clause, the parties can avoid the sanctions of a Board determination of the alleged violation
of the Act." 199 N.L.R.B. No. 69, 81 L.R-.RLM. 1310, 1312 (1972).
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Comments from the Viewpoint of an Arbitrator

It is particularly important and appropriate that Collyer be evaluated from an arbitrator's viewpoint because the heart of the problem
with that decision lies not in the logic of the decision itself, but rather
in the imperfect process of labor arbitration. Others, most notably
Judge Hays,' have identified some of the faults of the labor arbitration process. Now that the majority of the current Board seems in-

creasingly willing to entrust the protection and enforcement of important statutory rights to arbitration, it is time for a reappraisal of that
process.
The current majority on the Board obviously has faith in the arbitration process, but experience indicates that the Shulman-Cox-Douglas
notion of arbitration to which these Board members apparently subscribe exists only in books. Even a cursory glance at citations in the
Steelworkers Trilogy 5 2 will serve to show that the Supreme Court's
view of labor arbitration is not based upon empirical evidence or comprehensive studies of the process, but rather upon the personal work of
Shulman and Cox. If the perceptions of Shulman and Cox are not
wrong, they at least constitute exceptions to the general rule. If these
men and their experiences with arbitration were representative of the
process in general, the Board's Collyer policy would rest on more substantial ground. Unfortunately, this is not the case.
In Labor Arbitration, A Dissenting View, 5 3 Judge Hays makes several critical observations of the arbitration process which bear repeating here. Unlike the ideal described in the Steelworkers Trilogy, the
parties to arbitration generally choose an arbitrator not on the basis of
his ability to interpret the contract but on the basis of whether he is
likely to render a favorable decision. 5 4 In many instances, deference to
the so-called "specialized knowledge" of arbitrators is unwarranted for
a number of reasons. First, the parties are not looking for a "philosopher-king" or a statesman, but rather for an arbitrator who will stick to
the contract and not take liberties with the agreement in the name of
the common law of the shop. 55 Second, the differences between collective bargaining contracts and other types of contracts, a difference
thought to require the "specialized knowledge" of an arbitrator, is too
151 P. HAYS, LABOR ARBITRATION, A DlssENTiNG ViEw (1966).
152 See note 2 supra.
153 P. HAys, supra note 151.

154 Id. at 39.
'55 Id. at 41.
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often exaggerated. 15 Finally, the list of labor arbitrators and their
biographical sketches published by BNA affords no support for the
theory that arbitrators in general have any special expertise in the labor
relations field that gives them an advantage over judges, or for that
15 7
matter, Board members.
In addition, there are several serious faults with the arbitration
process that especially reflect on the unsuitability of the process for
resolving 8(a)(3) cases. First, the arbitrator does not have at his disposal
the type of investigative resources which the Board may bring to bear
on a suspected violation. Second, the adversary process does not work
effectively in the average arbitration case. The arbitrator can only consider that which is presented to him, but often neither the facts nor the
issues are clearly presented. Seldom is an arbitrator afforded the luxury
of deciding a case on a well-developed record. Finally, there is the even
more serious question of whether the average arbitrator has the experience, much less the inclination, to delve into and consider the intricate
questions of motivation or effect essential to the resolution of 8(a)(3) or
8(a)(1) charges. Too often the inquiry may end with "good cause" or
"just cause" considerations without going beneath the employer's action
to his motivation.158
One factor not yet considered by the Collyer adherents is the problem of arbitration awards which are compromised by arbitrators too
conscious of their "batting average." Knowledge of the number of
awards rendered each year is not necessary to support the conclusion
that the existence of such practices substantially reduces the worthiness
of the arbitration process for Board deferral. 15 9 The Board's Spielberg
guidelines are of no use here. The difficulty of detecting this type of
award means, of course, that the more cases in which the Board defers
the more it stands the chance of becoming an unwitting accomplice to
injustice.
Another factor against deferral to arbitration, one which has been
alluded to by Members Fanning and Jenkins, is simply that arbitration
is not as speedy, simple, or inexpensive as the Collyer majority might
like to think.16° Today, arbitration is sluggish, complicated, and costly.
156 Id. at 44.
157 Id. at 58.

158 The distinct possibility of this type of a superficial inquiry concerned dissenting
Board Members Fanning and Jenkins in National Radio Co., 198 N.LU.B. No. 1, 80
L.R3L.LL 1718, 1725 (1972).
159 Id. at 66.
169 Id.
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In the period from 1955 to 1956, the arbitration of a dispute took an
average of 156 days from the date of the grievance to the end of the
arbitration hearing.'6 ' The average time consumed has tended to increase since that study. By contrast, according to the General Counsel's
1970-71 Summary of Operations, the median processing time for unfair
labor practices before the Board in fiscal year 1970 was 115 days from
filing to the close of the hearing.6 2 As for the claim that arbitration is
simple because of the absence of "legal technicalities", it should be
remembered that legal forms are usually beneficial and frequently vital
to the just resolution of the kind of controversy which is treated in
arbitration.163 Finally, with arbitrators fees running as high as $500.00
per day or more, and with such expenses as lawyers fees and transcripts,
costing about the the same or more than they would for a Board case,
the arbitration process can hardly be called inexpensive. 10 4
Furthermore, there is some evidence that arbitrators hesitate to make
any more pronouncements on NLRB policy than are necessary. In a
survey of 2,300 labor arbitration awards and opinions covering
the period 1959 to 1967, and conducted for the American Arbitration
Association, it was determined that 338 cases contained issues within
the Board's jurisdiction. 6 Among these 338 cases, arbitrators acknowledged statutory issues in 54 cases, but in only 22 of these 54 cases
did the arbitrator attempt any discussion of the statutory problem. 00
From a reading of these 22 decisions, the survey's author concluded
that
[w]hen they [arbitrators] dispose of a grievance on a contractual
basis, they are inclined to treat statutory issues as irrelevancies. It
is in those cases that one finds most of the dicta about arbitration
and the NLRB being two separate forums with the arbitrator's
function being that of contract interpretation without regard to
the consequences if the same issue were brought to the Board
167

161 Ross, The Well-Aged Arbitration Case, 11 IND. & LAB. REL. L. Rxv. 262 (1958).
162 N.L.R.B. GENERAL COUNSEL, SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, 1970-71. In the absence of
contradictory data, it is assumed that the average time from the close of an arbitration or
Board hearing to the issuance of the arbitrator's or administrative law judge's decision

is approximately the same for both processes.
163 P. HAYs, supra note 151, at 68.
104
165
106
167

Id. at 67.

Waks, Arbitrator,Labor Board, or Both, 19

MONTHLY LAn.

Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 4.

HeinOnline -- 7 Ga. L. Rev. 638 1972-1973

REv. 1 (1968).

1973]

NIXON BOARD

Certainly such evidence is grounds for pause about the deferral policy
of Collyer.
What this survey suggests is that the Board's retention of jurisdiction
in Collyer deferral cases for the purpose of reviewing any ultimate
award is a somewhat, hollow safeguard against the violation of statutory
rights. Under Spielberg the award will be presumed to be worthy of
deferral if it meets general guidelines. It is questionable, however,
whether such a presumption is warranted when it is apparent from the
above study that a great many arbitrators treat statutory issues as irrelevancies. Under Airco Industrial Gases,10s the Board will not honor
an award if the arbitrator failed to consider the statutory question involved. But it is difficult to see how the Collyer majority can expect
statutory rights to be adequately protected when many arbitrators
come to their task with a preconceived aversion to statutory issues, and
consider those issues only to the extent of finding them irrelevant. The
difficulty of overcoming the presumptions of Spielberg and the likelihood that an arbitrator has considered statutory issues only in the
context of their irrelevance to his decision, indicate that the deferral
policy of Collyer may amount to the Board turning its head while
important statutory rights go unprotected and unenforced.
IV.

APPROPRIATENESS OF BARGAINING UNITS

The authority of the NLRB to determine appropriate bargaining
units has few limitations. Under section 9(b) of the NLRA Go the
Board has the authority subject to certain exceptions to decide in each
case whether "in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in
exercising the rights guaranteed by this act, the unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft
unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof....,70
In determining whether the unit petitioned for in a particular case
is appropriate, the Board has traditionally looked to "the community of interest among the employees sought to be represented;
whether they comprise a homogeneous, identifiable, and distinct group;
whether they are interchanged with other employees; the extent of
common supervision, the previous history of bargaining, and the
geographic proximity of various parts of the employer's operation."17
168 195 N.LR.B. No. 120, 79 L.P.L

1467 (1972).
169 NLRA § 9b, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970).
170 Id.
171 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 156 N.LR.B. 1408, 1412 (1966).
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In balancing the above factors the Board has recognized that there may
be more than one way in which employees may be appropriately
grouped for purposes of collective bargaining. The question raised by
the more recent decisions is whether among the possible appropriate
units the Nixon Board is going to favor larger bargaining units by
giving increased weight to the employer's administrative organization.
One indication of the policy of the Nixon Board on the appropriate
size for employee bargaining units has come from a recent case involving bargaining units in the retail chain industry. Up until 1962, the
Board's policy was to align bargaining units in the retail chain industry
with the employer's administrative division or the geographic area
involved. 172 Finding that this policy had too frequently operated to
impede the employees' exercise of section 7 organizational rights'7 in
174
retail chain operations, the Kennedy-Johnson Board in Say-On Drugs
decided to apply the same unit policy to retail chains as it applied to
other cases involving multi-unit enterprises. In 1964, the Board
broadened this holding by deciding that single-store units are pre175
sumptively apppropriate in the retail chain field.
In Gray Drug Stores,176 however, the Nixon Board indicated that it
would apply the standards established in earlier cases in a different
way. In Gray, the Board rejected the employer's request for a statewide
unit and the union's request for single-store units, and found an appropriate two-county unit consisting of twenty-one stores in Dade County,
Florida, and adjacent Broward County. The majority held that the
presumptive appropriateness of single-store units had been rebutted by
a lack of managerial autonomy at the single-store level, the close
geographic proximity of the stores, and the substantial and frequent
employee interchange between stores.1 71 In addition, it noted that the
supervisory authority was exercised by two distinct managers, each of
172 E.g., Daw Drug Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 1316 (1960).
173 NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). This section provides:

Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employ.
ment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
1 4 188 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1962).
175 Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 551 (1964).
176 197 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 80 L.R.R.M. 1449 (1972).
177 Id. at 1451.
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whom had authority over stores in both Dade and Broward Counties.
Thus a unit division based on counties would not be coextensive with
the division of supervisory authority over the stores. With the twocounty unit, there would be an intersection of geographical and administrative factors.
In their dissenting opinion, Members Fanning and Jenkins disagreed that the appropriateness of single-store units had been rebutted.
Furthermore, they argued that geographic considerations dictated not
a two-county unit but rather an eleven-store Dade County unit and a
ten-store Broward County unit, since both counties constituted standard
metropolitan statistical areas. Fanning and Jenkins concluded that
the majority had, in effect, held that factors of geography and administration must coincide where previously the Board's practice had been only
the employer's
to group retail chain store employees within either
8
area."7
geographical
a
or
administrative division
Whether the Nixon majority will in the future strive for larger
units which offer a geographical and administrative common denominator remains to be seen. While such a shift in policy may alleviate
some of the unit-fragmentation criticism leveled at the Kennedy-Johnson Board, one can only speculate on whether such larger units will be
detrimental to the exercise of employee organizational rights. It would
seem that the majority in Gray Drug Stores is paying homage to two
unit-determination factors which in concert will not necessarily assure
the employees involved the optimum exercise of their organizational
rights, but may in fact result in larger units which impede the exercise of such rights.
In another recent case, however, a majority of the Nixon Board
rested their decision almost solely on the employer's organizational
structure, even to the point of ignoring the unwieldy geographic size
of the unit. In Frito-Lay,Inc., 79 the Teamster's Union sought to establish a unit of some twenty-nine route salesmen, most of whom worked
out of the company's warehouse distribution center in Phoenix, Arizona.
The employer contended that the smallest appropriate unit would be
one comprising all of the route salesmen assigned to the company's region 2, which covered the territory of Phoenix and Tucson, Arizona,
and Las Vegas, Nevada.180 The Board majority agreed with the em178 Id. at 1452-53.
179 202 N.L.R.B. No. 143, 82 L.R.R.M. 1705 (1973).
180 Id. Region 2 includes six sales districts, each with its own district manager. Three
districts are based in Phoenix, two are based in Tucson, 120 miles to the southeast, and
one is based in Las Vegas, 293 miles to the northwest.
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ployer basing their conclusion upon a number of factors, among
others, "the almost total lack of autonomy at any level below the region,
the high degree of authority at the regional sales manager level over
hiring, transfer, promotion, discipline, discharge, and other terms and
conditions of employment, the fact that the Phoenix employees' contacts with one another are limited, and the lack of common supervision
in the requested unit. .. ."181 In addition, the majority specifically disavowed the dissenters' charge that their decision constituted a move
"to a new administrative theory calculated to insure unit control by
employer organization," and stated its decision to be in "reliance upon
those time-tested factors which establish what unit is appropriate for
18 2
collective bargaining."'
Again Members Fanning and Jenkins dissented. After noting that
any one factor among those relevant to unit determination might
justify the finding of a small unit, they accused the majority of selecting
as their decisional basis the one factor which is wholly employer-controlled--common supervision-and applying it in a manner that requires a two-state unit.8 3 In the eyes of the dissenters, the majority determined the unit without paying heed to "time-honored criteria like
employee community of interest, lack of interchange, and obvious geographic cohesiveness."' 1 4 Any one of these factors, and certainly the three
in combination, according to Members Fanning and Jenkins, dictated
a smaller unit. Furthermore, they regarded the district manager as
playing a more significant role in personnel matters than the majority
had conceded, and deemed the regional manager's role as involving
"paper work" approval.
Although the majority claimed to be "totally baffled"' 1 5 by the views
of the dissenters, their observation that the majority's rationale represents a "move from the statutory prohibition of unit control by extent
of employee organization to a new administrative theory calculated to
insure unit control by employer organization" seems justified' 8 0 There
are obvious geographic deficiencies in the two-state unit, and the majority's effort'8 7 to minimize such deficiencies is unconvincing. Likewise,
the majority unsuccessfully developed the employee community of in181 Id. at 1706.
182 Id. at 1707.
183 Id.

184
185
186
187

Id.
Id.
Id.
See

at 1708.
at 1706.
at 1707.
id. at 1705.
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terest and rather ineffectively attempted to establish the fact of significant employee interchange. In short, the majority seems to have
attempted to soften the impact of its preoccupation with the employer's
supervisory organization. If this decision represents the "wave of the
future," its rationale, even more so than that of Gray Drugs, will constitute a serious distortion of the Board's role under section 9(b).
Larger units based upon employer organization to the exclusion of
other related factors cannot help but impede employees' exercise of
their section 7 organizational rights. And employees who cannot organize cannot engage effectively in the very process which appropriate
unit determinations are supposed to facilitate-collective bargaining.
V.

LocKOUTs

In the development of the law of employer lockouts, the Board has
applied both 8(a)(1)18 8 and 8(a)(3)189 concepts in order to determine
whether an employer has unlawfully interfered with employee rights
to organize and bargain. Perhaps more so than in any other area of
labor law, the variations of individual philosophies can be traced into
ultimate factual conclusions that given employer conduct does, or does
not, violate these rights. The course of the law on lockouts is not based
upon actual evidence arising from particular cases, nor does it appear
to be grounded upon empirical data. In fact, the Board seems to have
based its changing position upon historical contemplation of past experience. As a result, the development of the "law" of lockouts; that
is, what lockouts "interfere" with employee rights and thus are impermissible, and what lockouts do not "interfere" and thus are permissible, is directly traceable to the underlying mental attitudes of the
Board members on the use of the lockout. This discussion will focus on
the law of employer lockouts under past Boards and the changes which
the Nixon Board has made in this area.
188 NLRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970). This section prohibits employer "interference" with rights guaranteed to employees by section 7 of the Act. See note 13 supra.
The National Labor Relations Board is empowered to weigh the extent of the actual
interference and balance it against the numerous property and civil rights possessed by
the employer. Although having some earmarks of a legal conclusion, the determination of
"interference" is largely an ultimate factual issue which, according to the Supreme Court,
reviewing courts should accept without direct evidence that particular conduct, in fact,
interferes with employee rights.
189 NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). See note 12 supra. Section 8(a)(3), long
thought to require actual proof of employer motive to discourage union membership, has
for several years now been interpreted within the context of presumptions arising from
objective evidence. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailer, Inc., 388 US. 26 (1967); NRILB v.
Erie Resistor Corp., 373 US. 221 (1963); Radio Officer's Union v. NLRB, 347 US. 17 (1954).
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A.

Truman Era
During the 1940's and early 1950's the Board viewed employer lockouts with a great deal of suspicion, permitting their use only in well
and narrowly defined circumstances. Lockouts were acceptable only
when "defensive" and when anti-union animus was clearly absent.
Thus the Board would not permit lockouts that came early in the
organizational or bargaining stages since there could be little if any
permissible economic justification for such lockouts, and the anti-union
animus of the employers was self-evident. 1 0 In addition, the Board
recognized that a lockout of employees while organizational activities
were underway would certainly have a devastating impact upon that,
and future organizational efforts. Similarly, a lockout close upon
the heels of a successful organizational effort, during the early stages of
bargaining, would have the foreseeable impact of undercutting the
organization by frustrating its purpose of collective bargaining. Thus
the Board realized that if such lockouts were permitted, employers
could avoid their statutory obligations to bargain. 1 1
The Board in this period did, however, recognize that "lockouts
are permissible to safeguard against unusual operational problems or
hazards or economic loss where there is reasonable ground for believing
that a strike was threatened or imminent." 10 2 The key word in this test
is "unusual." The economic loss which the employer attempted to
avoid by the lockout had to be more than that which normally flowed
from a strike. The damage had to be atypical; caused uniquely by the
timing of the work stoppage. Therefore, where a threatened strike
would cause spoilage of materials then in processing,1 03 or where a
strike would strand the goods of customers in the employer's shop,10 4 a
lockout was permitted. Professor Oberer has observed that the potential
economic loss in these and other cases was relatively insignificant, and
that other factors, including bargaining leverage, was probably the
motivating factor in the employer's use of the lockout.1 05 Nevertheless,
throughout the pre-Eisenhower period, the Board refused to recognize
190 See, e.g., North Country Motors, Ltd., 133 N.L.R.B. 1479 (1961); Flora Constr. Co.,
132 N.L.R.B. 776 (1961).
191 See, e.g., Scott Mfg. Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1961); Jay Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 1645 (1953).
192 Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 334, 337 (1958).
198 Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943).
194 See Packard Bell Electronics Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1122 (1961); Betts Cadillac Olds,
Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951).
195 Oberer, Lockouts and the Law: The Impact of American Ship Building and Brown

Foods, 51 Cornell L.Q. 193, 196-99 (1966).
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the legitimacy of "bargaining" or "offensive" lockouts and searched,
in each case, for atypical or "defensive" economic justification.
Furthermore, the Board steadfastly refused to recognize any special
economic justification flowing from a multi-employer bargaining unit. 00
When the union utilized "whipsaw" tactics by striking one member of
the unit at a time, the Board prohibited lockouts by the non-struck
members of the unit. There was no unusual economic need of the
particularemployer and a lockout was in the nature of a retaliation
against the union for exercising its right to strike at another employer.
In spite of overwhelming judicial rejection of this hard line against
using the lockout to defend against whipsaw strikes,1 0T the Board maintained its ground until its membership was ultimately altered in 1954.
B.

Eisenhower Era

The newly constituted Eisenhower Board made no revolutionary
shift in policy, but in applying the policy developed by the Truman
Board, a perceptible change was effected. In the well-known Buffalo
Linen198 case the question was raised as to the legality of lockouts by
non-struck members of a multi-employer unit in response to strikes
called at the shops of other members of the unit. In a brief opinion
refusing to accept the recommended decision of the trial examiner, the
Board recognized the interest of the individual employers in the solidarity of the multi-employer relationship and viewed lockouts by the
non-struck members as being defensive and privileged. Thus the Board
retained the old dichotomy of "offensive" v. "defensive," but appeared
to liberalize situations in which the employer's conduct would be considered "defensive." The Board implicitly recognized that the multiemployer bargaining unit was an important bargaining technique to
counterbalance the "monopoly" power of a single strong union.
Further, it held that the preservation of that unit against economic
attack warranted Board protection. This underlying philosophy is, of
196 Davis Furniture Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 279 (1951), remanded sub nom., Leonard v. NLRB,
197 F.2d 435 (9th Cir.), on remand sub noma., Davis Furniture Co., 100 N.L.RUB. 1016 (1952).
enforcement denied sub nom., Leonard v. NLRB, 205 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1953); Morand

Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.LR.B. 409 (1950), remanded, 190 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951). on
remand, 99 N.L..B. 1448 (1952), enforced, 204 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
909 (1953).
197 NLRB v. Continental Baking Co., 221 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Spalding
Avery Lumber Co., 220 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1955); Leonard v. NLRB, 205 F.2d 355 (9th Cir.
1953); Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 190 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951).
198 Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954).
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course, what one would expect from a so-called "pro-management"
Board.
Ironically, the second circuit reversed the Board. 00 On review, the
Supreme Court reversed the second circuit and thus affirmed the
Board.200 In this, its first lockout case, the Supreme Court indicated that
the Labor-Management Relations Act did not condemn lockouts per
se, nor was legality necessarily confined to narrowly defined, unusual
or unique circumstances. The Court held that Congress had committed
the fact-finding task primarily to the Board with only limited review of
its conclusions. The Court then observed that the Board had "correctly balanced the conflicting interests in deciding that a temporary
lockout to preserve the multi-employer bargaining basis from disintegration threatened by the... strike action was lawful."2 01
Thus, to a degree, as is true with any Supreme Court decision, a
"low water mark" was drawn, below which future Boards would have
difficulty in retreating. Admittedly, the "low water mark" derived from
this case is a hazy line caused by the clear announcement that the legislative scheme allows the Board to establish the permissible parameters
of the lockout. Nonetheless, future Boards would have difficulty in
denying the following propositions: first, that lockouts have some,
albeit ill-defined, legitimacy; and second, that lockouts are permissible
to protect interests not directly related to unusual economic loss to the
employer.
C.

Kennedy-Johnson Era
By the early 1960's the Board was strictly construing the Buffalo
Linen decision and applying its "defensive" v. "offensive" analysis to
strike down lockouts with a vigor perhaps unknown even in the Truman era. The extent to which the Board stretched to find a violation
in the face of its own pre-Eisenhower precedent can be illustrated by
an important case decided in that period, American Ship Building.20 2
There the employer, who was engaged in the highly seasonal business
of ship repairing, locked out a large majority of its employees in order
to avoid a strike at a time that would cause unreasonable damage to
himself and his customers. Although the trial examiner believed the
employer's actions economically justified, the newly constituted Board
199 Truck Drivers Union v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956).
200 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
201 Id. at 97.
202 American Ship Bldg. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1362 (1963), enforced, 331 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir.
1964), rev'd, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
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was not convinced that the employer was threatened with a peak season
strike. Rather, it felt that the employer was utilizing the lockout as an
offensive weapon to force a favorable settlement of the negotiating
dispute. Therefore, the Board held the lockout to be both coercive
and discriminatory within the meaning of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3).
The Supreme Court, however, agreed with the trial examiner that
a lockout was permissible under the circumstances. 203 Mr. Justice Goldberg particularly took issue with the Board's decision, categorizing its
finding that a strike was not threatened as "irrational," without a
"'scintilla" of evidence to support it.204 The assurance from union
representatives that no strike would be forthcoming was, in his opin20
ion, nothing more than "hopeful augury."
Justice Stewart speadng for a majority of the Court analyzed the
lockout in traditional 8(a)(1) 20 6 and 8(a)(8)207 terms. First, he could
find no interference with any "right" possessed by the employees under
section 8. There was no "interference" with the right to bargain because the parties had in fact bargained to impasse, and the right to
strike had not been interfered with since the right does not "carr[y]
with it the right exclusively to determine the timing and derivation of
all work stoppages." 208 Similarly, Justice Stewart held under section
8(a)(3) that lockouts to support a bargaining position were not inherently destructive of employee rights and, therefore, carried with
them no implication that the employer acted to discourage union membership. Since no evidence of actual anti-union animus existed, he
found that the Board had not proved the motive necessary for an
8(a)(3) violation.
Thus despite the. opposite thrust of its earlier decision in Buffalo
Linen, the Court was no longer willing to defer to the Board's findings
of fact that certain lockouts constituted "interference" or carried with
them improper motive. Although giving lip service to the role of the
Board in balancing competing interests, the Court suggested that as a
matter of law the Board could not be an "arbiter of the sort of economic weapons the parties can use in seeking to gain acceptance of
their bargaining demands." 209 In short, the Court in effect held in
203 380 U.S. 800 (1965).

204 Id. at 335.
205 Id. at 33.
206 See note 188 supra.
207 See note 189 supra.

208 380 US. at 310.
209 Id. at 317, quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agent's Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 497-93 (1960).
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American Ship Building that the lockout was a permissible weapon
and was to be examined under a traditional 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) analysis.
Thus the future utilization of the "offensive" v. "defensive" approach
to lockouts was largely precluded.
The Supreme Court dealt another serious blow to the Board's factfinding function when it refused to accept the Board's holding in
Brown Food.210 In that case, a union had struck a member of a multiemployer unit. In response, all of the employers of that unit locked
out their regular employees, and continued operation by hiring temporary replacements. According to the Board, no economic justification
existed for the non-struck employers' lockout of their employees.
In an opinion written by Mr. Justice Brennan, the Court held that
non-struck employers had a right to lock out their employees as a
method of preserving the multi-employer unit. Furthermore, the Court
recognized that a struck employer had a right to replace his strikers.
In so doing non-struck employers would be placed at an economic
disadvantage unless they too could hire replacements. The Court thus
could find no substantial "interference" with employee rights, and concluded that the business purpose in staying in business and preserving
the solidarity of the unit against whipsaw tactics prohibited the inference of illegal motive.
With American Ship Building unquestionably validating the use of
the lockout as a weapon to aid an employer's bargaining position, and
with Brown Food sanctioning the use of a lockout coupled with replacements under a situation that might be classified as "defensive,"
the attention of the Board necessarily turned away from the legality
of lockouts. The Board no longer had the broad and flexible power to
balance away the right of the employer to lock out because the Court
had established a new "low water mark." The Board had been effectively deprived of the power to retreat to an old analysis that would
declare most lockouts invalid.
The Court, however, did not resolve all lockout questions. The first
of these unanswered questions was the timing of the lockout. More
particularly, the Court left unresolved whether a bargaining impasse
was a condition precedent to a permissible lockout. The facts of Ameri.
can Ship Building and the comment of the Court expressly limiting its
decision to lockouts "after a bargaining impasse has been reached,"2 11
210 John Brown (d/b/a Brown Food Store), 137 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962), enforcement denied,
319 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1963), aff'd, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
211 380 U.S. at 318.
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left the Board with some room in which to maneuver within its factfinding role. From its earliest days the Board had held that the timing
of a lockout was directly related to an employer's ability to interfere
with employee rights. Organization and early bargaining lockouts had
always been outlawed. Given the Board's obvious opposition to the
bargaining lockout, regardless of its timing, it was quite predictable
that the Board, in its fact-finding capacity would limit American Ship
Building to its facts and conclude that a lockout prior to impasse "interfered" with the bargaining rights of the employees. Furthermore,
one might have predicted that the Board would have been quite strict
in determining when the parties, in fact, had reached a bargaining
impasse.
As perhaps an example of the exception that proves the rule, the
Board did not follow what would have appeared to have been its policy
predelictions. At first the Board refused to take the bait offered by the
Court in American Ship Building. In Ruberoid Co.,212 on a fairly debatable issue of whether an impasse had been reached, the Board affirmed the trial examiner's finding of an impasse, and thus the legality
of the bargaining lockout. In avoiding the issue, and thus perhaps
inadvertently, the Board established the precedent that an impasse
would not be strictly construed. In Darling& Co.213 the Board met the
issue directly. With one member dissenting the trial examiner's recommendation that an impasse was a necessary prerequisite to a valid
bargaining lockout was rejected. In so holding, the Board broadly interpreted the test it believed was dictated for its use by the Court in
American Ship Building. The majority stated that the absence of an
impasse may be some evidence of improper motive, but rejected any
per se rule that in every case the employer necessarily has the motive
of "hostility to the bargaining process"2 14 simply because he locks out
his employees before a bargaining impasse is actually reached. This
position has now been judicially confirmed,2 1 5 and it is doubtful at
this stage or in the foreseeable future that the Board will adopt any
per se rule requiring a bargaining impasse as a condition precedent to
a valid bargaining lockout.
The Court also left unresolved the right of an employer after a
212 167 NJ.-R.B. 987 (1967).
213 171 N.LMRB. 801 (1968), enforced sub nom., Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208 (D.C. Cir.

1969).
214 171 N.LR.B. at 802-03.

215 See, e.g., Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Detroit Newspaper Publisher

Ass'n, 346 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1965).
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lockout to bring negotiating pressure on a union by operating his
plant with temporary replacements or non-unit employees. The reaction of the Board to this problem was predictable. Unenthusiastic
about the bargaining lockout to begin with, it was not likely to accept
continued operation by the employer. Thus the Board held in Inland
Trucking210 that the factors of a bargaining lockout and continued
operation by utilization of temporary help was an interference with
employee rights not counterbalanced by employer justification, and
that such continued operation after a lockout was inherently destructive of employee rights, thus carrying with it conclusive proof of improper motive. In March, 1971, the Board's conclusion was affirmed
by the seventh circuit,217 which adopted similar reasoning. Both the
Board and the court, in rejecting any analogy to Brown Foods, held
that Brown Foods was a special situation in which the replacements
were not considered to be "economic weapons" and "were deemed
justified by particular circumstances as fair defensive responses to a
situation precipitated by a strike." 218 Thus the Board clung to the
battered remains of the old "defensive-offensive" dichotomy, not to
justify the lockout, but in its analysis of the "plus factor" of replacements.
D. Nixon Era
By the time the Seventh Circuit had affirmed Inland Trucking the
character of the Board was changing. Soon after that decision, the new
Nixon Board in Ottawa Silica Co. 210 was faced with a situation wherein
it could either re-evaluate, distinguish or apply Inland Trucking. The
facts in Ottawa Silica were quite similar to those in Inland Trucking
except that following the bargaining impasse and lockout, the employer continued operation, not by hiring temporary replacements, but
by the utilization of its own non-unit employees. On the basis of Inland Trucking, the trial examiner found that the offensive lockout
coupled with continued operations with non-unit employees constituted
unlawful "interference." That decision was reversed. Members Kennedy and Penello, speaking for the "majority," essentially re-evaluated
the premises upon which Inland Trucking was based. Chairman Miller
concurred on the ground that the facts in Inland Trucking were distinguishable and not controlling in the present case. In Inland Truck216
217
218
219

Inland Trucking Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 350 (1969).
440 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 564.
197 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 80 L.R.R.M. 1404 (1971).
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ing the operation continued by hiring new employees. In the present
case the operation was continued by utilization of the employer's own
employees, albeit non-unit employees. The Chairman apparently believed that this difference, rather minor in appearance, was decisive.
Holdovers from the Kennedy-Johnson era, Members Fanning and Jenkins joined in a dissent. They found Inland Trucking both persuasive
and controlling.
Unlike the Board of two years before, the two-man majority simply
could not find that the continued operation following a bargaining
lockout had an impact that was "inherently destructive."220 Rather,
they believed that its influence on employees was "comparatively
slight" having no "great tendency to discourage union membership."'22
While the Johnson Board distinguished Brown Foods as a special "defensive" situation, the Nixon appointees relied on Brown Foods as
sanctioning the use of replacements during a lockout.
The question of whether Inland Trucking was dead, or merely limited to its facts was perhaps answered by a Board decision, Inter
CollegiatePress.222 In Inter Collegiate Press, the Board was presented
with facts that were almost indistinguishable from those in Inland
Trucking. Following a bargaining lockout the employer hired new employees as temporary replacements. The trial examiner applied Inland
Trucking and found a violation. Again the Board reversed. Members
Kennedy and Penello nierely relied upon their opinion in Ottawa
Silica. Chairman Miller concurred on the basis of Brown Foods, and
indicated that he was opposed to any per se rule either giving blanket
validity or invalidity to the hiring of temporary replacements following a lockout. Instead, he believed that Brown Foods taught that the
facts of each case must be separately weighed to determine: (1) the extent of the tendency to discourage union activity, and (2) the balance
supplied by legitimate and significant business justification.2 2 3 Chairman Miller searched the record of this particular case and stated that
he was "unable to detect any evidence that the use of temporary replacements here had any greater tendency to discourage union membership than did like conduct in the Brown case."22
It is dear from the foregoing discussion that the difference between
220
221
222
223
224

179 N.L.R.B. at 356.
80 L.R.ML
at 1407.
199 N.LR B. No. 85, 81 LR.R.l.
81 LR.YM. at 1510-11.
Id. at 1511.

1508 (1972).
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the present Board and its predecessors is that one group of intelligent
and well-informed men viscerally reacted to a particular set of facts
with alarm, if not outright horror, and concluded that the employer's
action had an overpoweringly adverse impact on employee rights. Another group of intelligent and well-informed men viewed identical facts
and concluded that the "attempt to remain open for business with the
help of temporary replacements [is] a measure reasonably adapted to
the achievement of a legitimate end." 225 This difference cannot be
explained by the fact that in the two intervening years an empirical
study had revealed the true impact of replacements on the psyche of

locked out employees, or whether the presence of replacements, in fact,
had a chilling effect upon the bargaining process. The difference must
be based solely upon subjective suppositions and assumptions that are

drawn from the training, background, experience and philosophy of the
men themselves. There was an old saw in the 16th century that

the justice from the court of Chancery varied with the length of the
chancellor's foot. Should national labor policy in the 20th century

depend so largely upon the subjective evaluations of Board members?
If it does, the result may be judicial usurpation of the fact-finding role,
as has largely occurred in the lockout area.
VI.

BARGAINING ORDER REMEDIES

In 1969, in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. 22 3 the Supreme Court
upheld the Labor Board's issuance of a bargaining order as an appropriate remedy, even though the union had not been certified through the
Board's election process. 2 This decision expressly overruled those
225 80 L.R.R.M. at 1407.

595 U.S. 575 (1969).
227 Section 9(c) of the NLRA provides for Board elections and certification when questions concerning a union's representation arise. It provides in part:
Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such regulations as
may be prescribed by the Board(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor organization
acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial number of employees (i) wish to
be represented for collective bargaining and that their employer declines to rccognize their representative as the representative defined in section 9(a), or (ii) assert
that the individual or labor organization, which has been certified or is being
currently recognized by their employer as the bargaining representative as defined
in subsection (a) of this section; or
(B) by an employer, alleging that one or more individuals or labor organizations
have presented to him a claim to be recognized as the representative defined in
subsection (a) of this section;
the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that
a question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate
226
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parts of three per curiam opinions 228 by the Fourth Circuit in which
the court declined to enforce such orders on the ground that union
authorization cards are inherently unreliable indicators of union majority.229 Because of this inherent unreliability, the Fourth Circuit felt
that an employer should be entitled to withhold recognition of a union
until the results of a Board election and certification become known
to him.230 After the Gissel decision, however, the employer could be

forced to bargain with an uncertified union when tie employer has
been found to have committed serious unfair labor practices2 3 ' that
hearing upon due notice. Such hearing may be conducted by an officer or employee
of the regional office, who shall not make any recommendations with respect thereto.
If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results
thereof.
228 The Gissel decision represented a consolidation of four lower court cases, three of
which came from the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and one from the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit. NLRB v. Gissel Paking Co., 398 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1968),
modifying per curiam, 157 N.L.R.B. 1065 (1966); NLRB v. Heck's, Inc., 898 F.2d 337 (4th
Cir. 1968), modifying per curiam, 166 N.L.R.B. 186 (1967); General Steel Products, Inc. v.
NLRB, 398 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1968), modifying per curiam, 157 N.LR.B. 636 (196); and
NLR.B v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157 (Ist Cir. 1968), enforcing 164 N.L.RB. 261 (1967).
The Supreme Court affirmed the position of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968), enforcing 164 N.L.R.B. 261 (1967).
229 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.2d 836, 338-39 (1968).
230 Section 9(a) of the NLRA, enundates the concept of majority rule for purposes of
collective bargaining by providing in part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purpose of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exelusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions
of employment ....
NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). Under the majority rule concept an employer has
committed an unfair labor practice if he commences to bargain with a union that is not
representative of a majority of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit, even though
the employer may believe the union to represent such a majority at the time he begins
bargaining. See, e.g., International Ladies Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1960).
Thus the Fourth Circuit decisions relied on the position that an employer could withhold
recognition of a union claiming majority status, absent a Board certification of the union.
Furthermore, this court interpreted section 9(c) of the NLRA to require a Board certification election as a condition precedent to the Board's ability to grant certification to a
union claiming majority status.
231 Several examples of the serious unfair labor practices found by the Board in the
Gissel complex of cases were noted by the Court. According to the Board, the employers
had engaged in restraint and coercion of employees in violation of section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act by "coercively interrogating employees about Union activities,
threatening reprisals,
threatening them with discharge, and promising them benefits, ...
creating the appearance of surveillance, and offering benefits for opposing the Union....
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 583 (1969).
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interfered with the election process and tended to preclude the holding
of a fair election, 232 and when some other convincing means of the
233
union's majority status existed.
The Gissel decision is now probably the cornerstone and point of
origin for Board practice in the area of remedies for an employer's
refusal to bargain with a union claiming majority status by means
other than certification elections. The decision itself is well-known in
labor circles and has received extensive commentary in legal publications. 234 It is therefore not the present purpose of this discussion to
further analyze the Gissel decision, but rather to determine whether
the Nixon Board has answered one of the most significant questions
that has arisen with respect to the use of a bargaining order remedy
since Gissel-whether the Board, under any circumstances, will use its
remedial power under section 10(c) of the NLRA236 to issue a bar232

Id. at 594.

233

In Gissel, for example, the controversy was precipitated by and centered upon the

union's demand for recognition on the basis of a valid card majority. The Supreme Court
chose to recognize in some instances that although cards are inferior to the election process,
they can adequately reflect employee sentiment when the election process itself has been
impeded. In this regard, the Court approved a liberalized version of the Cumberland Shoe
doctrine, Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1964), for purposes of determining
whether authorization cards will be counted as valid in deciding the union's representative
status. Under this approach a single-purpose union authorization card, unambiguous on
its face, designating the union as the bargaining agent, will be counted unless the language
on the card "is deliberately and clearly cancelled by a union adherent with words calculated
to direct the signer to disregard and forget the language above his signature." NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 606 (1969).
234 See, e.g., Christensen, Gissel Packing and "Good Faith Doubt:" The Gestalt of Required Recognition of Unions Under the NLRA, 37 U. CHI. L. Rzv. 411 (1970); Platt, The
Supreme Court Looks at Bargaining Orders Based on Authorization Cards, 4 GA. L. REv.
779 (1970); Note, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.: Bargaining Orders and Employee Free
Choice, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 318 (1970); 1969 DuKE L.J. 1075.
235 The Board's remedial power becomes operative under section 10(c) of the NLRA
once an unfair labor practice is proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Section 10(c)
provides in relevant part:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion
that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such
unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall Issue
and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and
desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including
reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies
of this subchapter ....

The Board's proper exercise of its remedial power is discussed in the following line of
decisions. Textile Workers v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1967); J.P. Stevens & Co. v.
NLRB, 380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1967); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
See also Fanning, New and Novel Remedies for Unfair Labor Practices, 3 GA. L. REV.
256 (1969); Note, A Survey of Labor Remedies, 54 VA. L. Rav. 38 (1968).
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gaining order as a remedy for an employer's unfair labor practices
which tend to make the holding of a fair election impossible, and
which are committed at a time before the union involved has made an
otherwise convincing showing of majority status through the use of
authorization cards or by some other means.23 0
At the outset, this question seems to require the Board to become
concerned with what are sometimes two competing interests. On the
one hand, there is the interest in preserving employee freedom of
choice; that is, freedom to choose which union the majority of employees desire to represent them, or freedom to choose no collective
bargaining representative at all if the employees so desire. On the other
hand, however, lies the interest in preserving national labor policy,
a necessary ingredient of which is to provide a wholesome environment
within which the collective bargaining process may be effectuated.
When an employer commits what have been labeled outrageous and
pervasive unfair labor practices that tend to preclude the possibility
of a union's obtaining majority status, this environment is destroyed.
The question then becomes whether a bargaining order is a proper
remedy under these circumstances, or whether the Board is faced with
its own type of Hobson's -choice by having at hand only traditional
remedies for section 8(a)(1),23 7 8(a)(2)2 38 or 8(a)(3)230 violations.
As a matter of certainty the Court in Gissel suggested the possibility
that the use of a bargaining order without inquiry into majority status
could be an appropriate remedy in exceptional cases marked by outrageous and pervasive unfair labor practices..2 40 However, in Gissel
there was a showing of majority status through union authorization
cards, and the question of whether a bargaining order could issue for
236 See note 8 sup-a.

237 N.ILA § S(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
NLRA § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1970).
239 NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
240 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 595 U.S. 575, 613-14 (1969). The Court stated:
238

Mhe Fourth Circuit ...left open the possibility of imposing a bargaining order,
without need of inquiry into majority status on the basis of cards or otherwise, in
"exceptional" cases marked by "outrageous" and "pervasive" unfair labor practices.
Such an order would be an appropriate remedy for those practices, the court noted,

if they are of "such a nature that their coercive effects cannot be eliminated by the
application of traditional remedies, with the result that a fair and reliable election
cannot be had." The Board itself, we should add, has long had a similar policy of
issuing a bargaining order, in the absence of a § 8(a)(5) violation or even a bargaining
demand, when that was the only available, effective remedy for substantial unfair
labor practices.
Id. (citations omitted).
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outrageous unfair labor practices absent a showing of majority status,
was not directly before the Court.241 Furthermore, the Gissel decision
was rendered by the Warren Court, with the Chief Justice himself
delivering the opinion. The obvious question therefore is whether,
even should the Board make such use of the bargaining order remedy,
the present Court would uphold its validity. While this question is
beyond the scope of this discussion, its presence, of course, is heavily
felt.
The question of whether the Nixon Board was willing to move beyond the area of traditional remedies for employer unfair labor practices during a union organizational drive, arose in the recent case of
J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB. 242 There the union demanded recognition as the bargaining representative of a majority of employees on
the basis of union authorization cards.2 43 The employer, however, refused to grant recognition and assumed the union would refer to the
Labor Board. The union did so, filed an election petition, and thereafter lost the election. 244 The union immediately filed unfair labor
practice charges before the Board. 245
In finding a bargaining order to be an appropriate remedy in these
circumstances under the Gissel iationale, the Board adopted the trial
examiner's findings and recommendations 240 that the employer was
guilty of extensive unfair labor practices which violated sections
8(a)(1) 247 and 8(a)(3) 248 of the NLRA. Further, the Board seemed to
conclude that the unfair labor practices committed by the employer
were of such nature that the holding of a rerun election would not
fairly express true employee sentiment. 240 Under these circumstances
395 U.S. 575 (1969).
441 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1971), enforcing 179 N.L.R.B. 254 (1971).
Id. at 516-17.
Id. at 517. The union lost the election by a vote of 198 to 110.
The Fifth Circuit made it clear in a footnote in its opinion that a union does not
waive its right to assert unfair labor practices before the Board by first proceeding with an
unfavorable Board election. It stated that "[i] Is now clear that even though a union has
requested a Board election, it is not precluded from obtaining recognition, following Its
election defeat, through the unfair labor practice procedure." Id. at 517 n.8 (citations
omitted).
246 J.P. Stevens & Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 254, 255-85 (1969).
247 NLRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970). See note 13 supra.
248 NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). See note 12 supra.
249 The Board determined that the employer's unfair labor practices were calculated
to and in fact did dissipate what was once the union's majority status. Under the drcum.
stances they determined that the holding of a "fair and coercion free" rerun election to
be improbable if not impossible. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 179 N.L.R.B. 254 (1969).
241
242
243
244
245
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the Board deemed it appropriate to order the employer, Stevens, to
bargain with the union. However, it is clear from the Board opinion
that it considered the union to have had at one time a showing of
majority status through the use of cards.250 Since the employer's serious
unfair labor practice unfairly dissipated such status, it appeared unlikely that employee freedom of choice would be harmed to any significant extent by the order to bargain. While the Board's bargaining
order in J.P. Stevens was thus apparently grounded in the unions
previous showing of majority status through the use of cards, and
therefore in line with the Gissel rationale, the Fifth Circuit in granting
enforcement 251 of the bargaining order seemed to place its primary
reasoning on other grounds. Specifically the court indicated that it
might condone the issuance of a bargaining order as a proper remedy
for outrageous unfair labor practices even despite the absence of a con2- 2
vincing showing of union majority.
Thus there are grounds for believing that the Supreme Court and
at least one federal court of appeals might approve the use of a bargaining order as a justifiable remedy for serious unfair labor practices
which would undermine the holding of a fair election, even when the
union has failed to demonstrate majority status. Since the Gissel opinion was decided after the Nixon administration had already taken
office, one can only speculate what would have been the Board's posidon on this question had Gissel been decided earlier in the Johnson
administration. 25 3 However, from recent decisions it appears that the
250 Id. at 282, 283.
251 J.p. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1971).
252 The Court spoke of two circumstances under the Gissl decision which would justify
the bargaining remedy. The first of these is a situation in which the union has never
demonstrated majority support in an appropriate unit, but where the employer has committed unfair labor practices that are so "outrageous" and "pervasive" that their "coercive
effects cannot be eliminated by the application of traditional remedies, with the result
that a fair and reliable election cannot be had." Id. at 519. The second occurs when the
employer's unfair labor practices are less pervasive and, as a result, the Board, "to protect
employee free choice, must determine not only that a fair election is improbable, but also
that at one point the union had a majority." Id. The Fifth Circuit, while later noting that
a card showing had once been made by the union, went on to say. "In agreement with the
Board we think the present proceedings constitute one of those 'exceptional' cases marked
by 'outrageous' and 'pervasive' unfair labor practices which, under GisseI, justify the issuance of a bargaining order despite the absence at one point of a union-demonstrated
majority." Id. at 521.
253 It should perhaps be noted here that all of the four decisions consolidated before
the Supreme Court in Gissel were decided by the Board within a fifteen month period
from March 11, 1966, to June 28, 1967. General Steel Prod,, Inc. v. NLRB, 157 N.LRB.
636 (1966), was decided on March 11, 1966 before Members Brown, Fanning and Zagoria;
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Nixon Board has not seen fit to issue a bargaining order in the absence
of a union demonstrated majority.
In the case of Loray Corp.,2 4 the union began an organizational
campaign in January of 1969 which lasted through May of that year.
During this time the employer conducted no less than twelve "captive
audience" 255 meetings in response to the organizational campaign. Also
the employer, among other things, threatened to fire employees for
union activity, caused the arrest of a union representative for distributing handbills in the plant's vicinity, and threatened to close the plant
if the union came in.256 These acts were followed by actual discharge
of at least one employee, who was, coincidentally, actively involved in
union activity, for a poor production record. 257 In all, the trial examiner found twenty-three instances of unlawful interference with
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 1065 (1966), was decided on March 25, 1966
before Members Fanning, Brown and Jenkins; NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 261
(1967) was decided on May 2, 1967 before Chairman McCulloch and Members Brown and
Jenkins; and NLRB v. Heck's, Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. 186 (1967) was decided on June 28, 1967
before Members Fanning, Jenkins and Zagoria. This time period, of course, was during
the height of the Johnson administration. The Supreme Court's decision, however, was
handed down on June 16, 1969, after the Nixon administration had been in offlce for
some five months.
254 184 N.LR.B. No. 57, 74 L.R.R.M. 1513 (1970).
255 Under the decision of NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958), it is not
unlawful discrimination within the meaning of NLRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)
(1970), for an employer to use his own premises to deliver anti-union propaganda and to
deny the same to the union. See also NLRB v. Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400
(1953). However, there must be other available means of union access to employees. NLRB
v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 386 U.S. 226
(1946). The test of whether an employer's propaganda constitutes unlawful coercion is
found in NLR.B v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941). Employer conduct
which might not be enough to bring about an unfair labor practice finding under section 8(a)(1) may be enough to justify the Boird's setting an election aside. E.g., General
Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948). See also Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962).
256 Loray Corp., 184 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 74 L.R.R.M. 1513 (1970).
257 Id. at 1515. The present test for determining whether an employer's conduct is in
violation of section 8(a)(3) was enunciated by Chief Justice Warren in NLRB v. Great
Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967), which approved several prior decisions on
the same issue. The Court dispensed with the traditional concept of finding motive, either
express or implied, to encourage or discourage union membership. Such an analysis was
used by Justice Harlan in Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961). In Great
Dane the Court apparently turned to an effect analysis. If the effect of the employer's
discriminatory conduct is inherently destructive of important employee rights, then no
proof of actual motivation by the employer to encourage or discourage union membership
is necessary, and the Board is justified in finding a section 8(a)(3) violation even though
the employer may have advanced a substantial business justification. However, where the
adverse effect of the discriminatory conduct is comparatively slight, then a showing of
actual motive on the part of the employer must be made to find a section 8(a)(3) viola.
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employee rights25s along with several section 8(a)(3) violations.250 The
Board adopted the trial examiner's findings that the employer had
violated sections 8(a)(1) 260 and 8(a)(3) 20 ' of the NLRA and consequently
20 2
issued a lengthy list of remedies..
During the period of its organizational drive, the union had demanded recognition at least once from the employer as bargaining
representative of the production and maintenance unit of employees.2 0
Moreover, some employees engaged in a "stand out" during this time
to protest the employer's discriminatory conduct and to consequently
show their union support. 2 However, the Board refused to adopt the
trial examiner's recommendation that a bargaining order should be
issued, stating:

Although we agree that Respondent's conduct was 'outrageous'
and 'pervasive,' we are of the opinion that a bargaining order in
the circumstances here is not appropriate.
We note that the record does not at any point reveal a showing
of majority status on the part of the Union.... [N]o substantial
evidence of employee interest in the Union was introduced at the
tion, if the employer advances a substantial business justification for his conduct. NLRB v.
Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967). E.g., NLRB v. Brown, 880 U.S. 278
(1965); American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 380 US. 300 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring);
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 US. 221 (1963).
258 Loray Corp., 184 NLRB No. 57, 74 L.R.R.I1. 1513 (1970).
259

Among the section 8(a)(3) violations found were discriminatory discharge and layoff

of employees. Id. at 1515-16.
260 See note 247 supra.
261 See note 248 supra.
262 Among the remedies issued by the Board were: (1) each employee must be advised
individually of his statutory rights and his exercise of those rights must be respected by
the employer; (2) the chief executive officer and owner of the company must personally
sign notices to employees; (3) the company must personally read the notice to all employ.
ees at an assembled meeting; (4) the employer must mail the notices to all employees so
that they may read them at their own leisure; (5) union access to bulletin boards must be
granted; (6) the company must give the union access to company facilities that are customarily used for employee meetings in order to rebut the impact of employer coercion; (7)
the employer must supply the union with names and addresses of employees; and (8) a
board election must be held since under the circumstances, the Board found it would be
impossible for the union to obtain the required number of employee signatures for
a petition.
The Board noted that these extensive remedies were not intended to be punitive or to
harass the employer, but were necessary in light of the employer's flagrantly coercive and restraining conduct. Loray Corp., 184 N.L.B. No. 57, 74 L.R.R.M 1513 (1970). See J.P.
Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1971); Textile Workers v. NLRB, 388 F.2d
896 (2d Cir. 1967). See also Note, A Survey of Labor Remedies, 54 VA. L. REV. S8 (1968).
263 Loray Corp., 184 N.LR.B. No. 57, 74 LR.IRIUL 1513 (1970).
264 Id. at 1515.
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hearing, and union authorization cards allegedly secured by the
Union were not placed into evidence. The record, therefore, does
not reflect how many, if any, valid authorization cards were obtained by the Union. Indeed, the issue of the Union's majority
status, or the desire of the Respondent's employees in being represented by the Union was not litigated at any state of the proceeding. Moreover, we have devised special remedies for the
aggravated and pervasive 8(a)(1) and (3) violations which in our
opinion will enable employees freely to exercise their Section 7
rights to choose whether or not they wish to be represented by
the Union. In the circumstances, we find, therefore, that a bargaining order is not appropriate, and the Trial Examiner's recommended remedy and order in regard thereto is not adopted.0"
Perhaps a bargaining order would have been issued had not an extensive list of remedies already been compiled by the Board. 2°0 Moreover,
the Loray case did not indicate just how substantial the majority showing must be before the Board deems it justified under the circumstances to infer such status and issue a bargaining order. Whatever the
outcome under other circumstances, however, a later decision, Louisburg Sportswear Co. v. NLRB, 2°7 suggests that it is still not Board
policy to issue a bargaining order when no convincing evidence of a
representative majority has been shown by the union.
Louisburg Sportswear involved a union demand for recognition on
the basis of ninety-four cards obtained from the 180 employees of the
employer. The employer declined recognition, however, and a subsequent election was held which the union lost, whereupon it filed with
the Board charges of unfair labor practices against the employer. The
Board found the employer's unfair labor practices to be "so flagrant and
coercive in nature as to require, even in the absence of an 8(a)(5)
violation, a bargaining order to repair the effect." 2°8 The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit seemed to interpret this language as
saying that the Board found the employer's unfair labor practices to be
so pervasive and outrageous as to warrant the imposition of a bargaining order "whether or not the union ever had a valid card major265 Id. at 1517.
200 See note 262 supra.
267 462 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1972), enforcing in part, 180 N.L.R.B. 739 (1970).
208 Louisburg Sportswear Co. v. NLRB, 180 N.LR.B. 739, 740 (1970). The Board rellcd
on the Gissel opinion to support its holding. See notes 249 & 250 supra.
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However, an addendum to the Fourth Circuit's opinion -

0

indicates that such an interpretation is incorrect. That addendum
states:
[O]ur interpretation of the Board's decision is questioned to the
extent that we construed that decision to order bargaining whether
or not a card majority ever existed. This interpretation was
prompted by our examination of the language of the Board's
decision in light of the language of Gissel. The Board disclaims
any policy or authority under existing Board decisions to order
bargaining in the absence of a card majority and states that this
has been the Board's practice both before and after Gissel. In this
case, the Board relied on its finding that at "times material herein"
the union represented a majority of the employees. Therefore,
our opinion should not be read as a statement that the Board's
bargaining order had a secondary basis independent of the finding
of a card majority or as implying that the Board, in this or any
other case, has exercised an authority it now disclaims. 2r
On the basis of this language, it seems that the Nixon Board will not
extend the Gissel decision to situations in which a union is unable to
demonstrate majority status. This approach is unfortunate because it
means that bargaining orders will not be issued when dere is no dearly
demonstrated union majority, regardless of the conduct of an employer.
Outrageous and pervasive unfair labor practices occurring early in a
union's organizational campaign may eliminate any possibility of a
union's obtaining majority status. As a result, an employer could avoid
the requirements of bargaining with a union by making it impossible
for that union to ever obtain majority status. Certainly the interest in
preserving employee freedom of choice must be carefully protected.
But if the cost of insisting upon a clear showing of majority status is
the frustration of the collective bargaining process, that interest must
be protected in some other way. When an employer has made it impossible for a union to effectively organize and thus obtain any showing
of majority support, the Board should use its remedial power under
22
section 10(c) of the NLRA to issue a bargaining order.
270

Louisburg Sportwear Co. v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 380, 382 (4th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 387.

271

Id.

269

Although outside the scope of this discussion, perhaps the most significant recent
development with respect to the Board's use of a bargaining order is the case of NLRB v.
Mansion House Center Management Corp., 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973). For a discussion
of the case itself and its impact on labor policy, see 7 GA. L. REV. 770 (1973).
272
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CONCLUSION

This Article has attempted to review some of the most significant
changes in Labor Board policy during the Nixon administration, and
to examine these changes in light of previous Board policy. While only
those cases most clearly indicating this evolution have been discussed,
each section represents a synthesis of many Board decisions. As a result,
it has been possible to discern trends in the development of the law in
each of the areas examined and to pinpoint departures from past Board
approaches.
A brief summary of the conclusions reached in each section may
prove helpful. During the Nixon administration, the Board has indicated an unwillingness to find violations of sections 8(a)(1) and 9 of
the NLRA on the basis of speeches made by the employer. 27 3 In the
important area of mandatory subjects of bargaining under section
8(a)(5), the Board seems to have reestablished a distinction between
subjects appropriate for employee bargaining and those that should be
exclusively within management control. 274 From recent cases expanding
Collyer Wire, it appears that the Nixon Board will continue to defer
to arbitration processes in an increasing number of situations.27 3 In
addition, the Board under section 9(b) of the NLRA apparently will
designate larger units based upon employer organization as appropriate
units for collective bargaining. 276 In the lockout area, the Board has
indicated that fewer employer lockouts will be considered violative of
employee rights. 277 Finally, it seems that the Board will not issue a
bargaining order under the rationale of Gissel as a remedy for an employer's unfair labor practices when the union cannot make a convincing showing of majority status. 278
These changes demonstrate the limited application of the tenet that "a
well established principle, expressive of the earlier decisions, is clearly
dispositive of the controversy.1 27 0 Labor law continually evolves and
develops as the composition of the Board and political disposition of
the country changes. The purpose of this Article has been to illustrate
this process by comparing the approach of the Nixon Board with the
See pp. 608-17 supra.
See pp. 617-22 supra.
See pp. 622-39 supra.
See pp. 63943 supra.
See pp. 643-52 supra.
See pp. 652-61 supra.
E.H. LE, AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REASONING (1972), quoting O'Meara, Natural
Law and Everyday Law, 5 NATuRAL LAw FORUM 83, 87 (1960).
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
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approaches of past Boards. Hopefully, it has provided the reader with
an insight not only into the significance of recent changes in labor
policy, but also into the nature of Board operation and its impact on
labor law.
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